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Articles 
Bargaining over Loyalty 
Daniel A. Crane* 
Contracts between suppliers and customers frequently contain provisions 
rewarding the customer for exhibiting loyalty to the seller.  For example, 
suppliers may offer customers preferential pricing for buying a specified 
percentage of their requirements from the supplier or buying minimum 
numbers of products across multiple product lines.  Such loyalty-inducing 
contracts have come under attack on antitrust grounds because of their 
potential to foreclose competitors or soften competition by enabling tacit 
collusion among suppliers.  This Article defends loyalty inducement as a 
commercial practice.  Although it can be anticompetitive under some 
circumstances, rewarding loyal customers is usually procompetitive and price 
reducing.  The two most severe attacks on loyalty discounting—that loyalty 
discounts are often disguised disloyalty penalties and that loyalty clauses 
soften competition—are unlikely to hold as a general matter.  Nor are 
arguments that customers only accede to loyalty inducements because of 
collective action problems generally true.  Dominant buyers who face few 
collective action problems frequently use loyalty commitments to leverage their 
buying power and obtain lower prices. 
These kinds of agreements allow firms to reward their most loyal 
customers.  Rewarding customer loyalty promotes competition on 
the merits.1 
Introduction 
Loyalty has an unambiguously positive connotation in ordinary 
discourse and in most legal fields.2  For example, ethical canons require 
 
 * Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan Law School.  Various people generously provided comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper or on pieces of it disseminated in various places including a Wall Street Journal 
editorial, an amicus curiae brief in Eaton Corp. v. ZF Meritor LLC, and the Truth on the Market 
blog.  For such input, I thank Roger Blair, Doug Melamed, Louis Kaplow, Thom Lambert, Mark 
Lemley, Geoff Manne, Steve Salop, Danny Sokol, Abe Wickelgren, and Josh Wright.  It should 
always go without saying that the views expressed are solely mine and that all errors remain my 
fault, but that is especially true in this case.  Caroline Flynn provided excellent research 
assistance. 
1. Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Plc, 257 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2001). 
2. See generally ERIC FELTEN, LOYALTY: THE VEXING VIRTUE (2011) (examining the virtue 
of loyalty in historical and contextual perspective). 
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attorneys to remain faithful to their clients;3 trustees and board members 
owe fiduciary duties to beneficiaries and shareholders;4 spouses enjoy 
testimonial privileges based on social conventions respecting marital 
loyalty;5 adultery remains criminalized in most states and a felony in some;6 
democratic theory requires judges to remain faithful to the will of the 
people expressed in constitutions or statutes;7 and the law metes out far 
greater, harsher punishment on the traitor than the common enemy.8  
George Fletcher has observed that “[s]ome of the strongest moral epithets 
in the English language are reserved for the weak who cannot meet the 
threshold of loyalty: They commit adultery, betrayal, treason.”9  Reflecting 
venomous disapprobation of treachery, Dante placed the traitors Brutus, 
Cassius, and Judas Iscariot in Lucifer’s jaws in Hell’s ninth circle.10  In 
most contexts, loyalty only becomes difficult ethically and morally when 
loyalty obligations collide—when loyalty to one person means disloyalty to 
another.11 
Antitrust law is exceptional—loyalty receives a far less congenial 
welcome.  Antitrust values rivalry between competing sellers, which 
implies an opportunity to steal business from the rival.  Customer loyalty 
obstructs this hydraulic action.  Particularly troubling are inducements to 
loyalty offered by firms with market power.  When dominant sellers offer 
customers incentives to remain loyal to the seller, these loyalty incentives 
may stifle competition and harm the very customers offered the ostensibly 
favorable terms.  Even if the customer understands the loyalty incentive’s 
 
3. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980) (specifying the 
requirements of lawyer loyalty to a client). 
4. See, e.g., Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 
11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 678 (2009) (explaining that the power to be a member of a board of 
directors in Delaware is accompanied by certain fundamental fiduciary obligations). 
5. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2333 (John T. 
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (outlining the history of spousal privilege since its inception). 
6. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 2000) (specifying that adultery is 
punishable by imprisonment or fine for both married and unmarried persons); id. ch. 274, § 1 
(classifying crimes punishable by imprisonment as felonies); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.30 
(West 2004) (criminalizing adultery for both married and unmarried persons). 
7. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395, 441 (1995) (“[F]idelity is pursued by courts subject to the constraints of 
uncontested discourses, which means, subject to the constraint that decisions not appear to be 
simply the will of a court versus the will of the legislature.”). 
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006); George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 
193, 195 (1982) (recognizing that “[t]he element of breached loyalty” is an important component 
of the treason penalty). 
9. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 8 
(1993). 
10. DANTE ALIGHIERI, 1 THE DIVINE COMEDY: INFERNO 537 (Robert M. Durling ed. and 
trans., 1996). 
11. See FELTEN, supra note 2, at 47–78 (discussing the “tragic” nature of conflicting 
loyalties). 
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exclusionary or collusive potential, she may find it to be in her economic 
interest to accept the incentive since other customers will be accepting it 
regardless of her decision.  Dominant firms may require their customers to 
remain loyal for the purpose of starving rivals of sales opportunities, thus 
ensuring that in the long run there are no other sellers to tempt customers 
into disloyalty.  Or, they may use loyalty incentives to facilitate 
supracompetitive oligopolistic pricing. 
Loyalty or fidelity incentives have recently been challenged under the 
antitrust laws in the United States and the European Union.  For example, 
parallel cases in the U.S. and EU against British Airways and Intel 
challenged those dominant firms’ practices of incentivizing customers—
travel agents or computer manufacturers—to remain loyal to British 
Airways or Intel at the expense of smaller rivals, Virgin Atlantic and 
AMD.12  Scores of other cases challenging loyalty discounts, rebates, or 
other incentives have been filed on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly in 
private lawsuits in the U.S.13  An extensive academic literature assesses the 
ways in which loyalty incentives can exclude competitors or soften 
competition.14 
 
12. Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Plc, 257 F.3d 256, 259 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(rejecting Virgin Atlantic’s challenge to British Airways’ loyalty incentives to travel agents); Case 
C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 22 (finding 
British Airways’ commission schemes had a discriminatory effect for the purposes of the EC 
Treaty); Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding Under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, 2009 O.J. (C 227) 13, 17 
[hereinafter 2009 Commission Decision Summary] (summarizing a decision that found Intel’s 
market share rebates to original equipment manufacturers incompatible with European Union law 
and fining Intel €1.06 billion); Complaint ¶¶ 2–6, Intel Corp., 150 F.T.C. 420 (2010) (No. 9341) 
[hereinafter Intel Complaint] (challenging Intel’s market share rebates to original equipment 
manufacturers).  The European Commission provided an official summary of its Intel decision in 
order to protect the business secrets of the parties.  2009 Commission Decision Summary, supra, 
at 13.  A nonconfidential version of the Commission’s 518-page decision is also available.  
EUROPEAN COMM’N, NON-CONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF THE COMMISSION DECISION OF 13 MAY 
2009 (2009) [hereinafter NON-CONFIDENTIAL COMMISSION DECISION], http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37990/37990_3581_18.pdf. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 48–54. 
14. The literature on the potential anticompetitive effects of loyalty discounts includes 
Richard A. Duncan & Brian S. McCormac, Loyalty & Fidelity Discounts & Rebates in the U.S. & 
EU: Will Divergence Occur Over Cost-Based Standards of Liability?, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 133 
(2008); Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting, 5 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 189 (2009); Gianluca Faella, The Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty 
Discounts and Rebates, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 375 (2008); Joseph Farrell, Deconstructing 
Chicago on Exclusive Dealing, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 465 (2005); Jonathan M. Jacobson, A Note 
on Loyalty Discounts, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2010, art. 2, at 1, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jun10_FullSource6_24.
authcheckdam.pdf; Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1073, 1203–13 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Benjamin Klein 
& Andres V. Lerner, The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents 
Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 473 (2007); Bruce H. Kobayashi, 
The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United States, 1 COMPETITION 
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Although loyalty incentives can harm competition, they also can 
enhance consumer welfare by driving down prices and facilitating more 
efficient exchange between buyers and sellers.  One strand missing in the 
current literature—which largely focuses on the deployment of loyalty 
incentives by dominant sellers—is the extent to which customers play a 
strong role in proposing and propagating the use of loyalty incentives.  
Customers willingly exchange loyalty commitments for lower prices.  This 
phenomenon cannot simply be dismissed as the product of customer 
collective action problems.  Monopsony or oligopsony buyers who face few 
collective action problems frequently use loyalty discounts to drive prices 
down.  The federal government, perhaps the world’s most powerful buyer, 
frequently uses loyalty incentives to drive down its acquisition costs.  
Collective purchasing societies such as hospital group purchasing 
organizations (GPOs), pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), and buyer 
cooperatives, which are formed in large part to solve collective action 
problems, often push for loyalty discounts or rebates as part of their 
strategy to lower their member prices.15  Academic marketing literature 
describes loyalty as a bargaining chip that can be beneficially exploited by 
both strong and weak buyers.16 
This Article contributes to the ongoing legal and economic discussion 
over loyalty discounts in three ways.  First, in Part I, it situates the 
conversation over loyalty discounts within the broader conversation over 
exclusionary practices and the law’s response.  In particular, Part I 
distinguishes loyalty discounts from volume discounts, introduces the 
current legal treatment of loyalty discounts in the United States and 
 
POL’Y INT’L 115 (2005); David E. Mills, Inducing Downstream Selling Effort with Market Share 
Discounts, 17 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 129 (2010); Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1137 (1991); Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: Comment, 90 
AM. ECON. REV. 296 (2000); David Spector, Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competition 
Concerns and a Proposed Structured Rule of Reason, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89 (2005); 
Willard K. Tom et al., Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to 
Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615 (2000); Einer Elhauge & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 
Anti-Competitive Exclusion and Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts (The Univ. of Tex. 
Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 216, 2011) [hereinafter Elhauge & 
Wickelgren, Anti-Competitive Exclusion], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1937658; Einer Elhauge & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion Through 
Loyalty Discounts (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
10-15, 2010) [hereinafter Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544008; Patrick Greenlee & David Reitman, 
Competing with Loyalty Discounts (Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. 04-2, 2005); 
Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer, Rent Shifting, Exclusion, and Market-Share Discounts (June 
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.simon.rochester.edu/fac/shaffer/ 
Published/rentshift.pdf; Janusz Ordover & Greg Shaffer, Exclusionary Discounts (Ctr. for 
Competition Policy, Working Paper No. 07-13, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=995426. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 230–40. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 246–56. 
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European Union, and discusses the way that U.S. antitrust law on loyalty 
discounts is likely to evolve in light of recent precedent—not primarily by 
the development of new legal rules but by the expression of judicial 
maxims such as the quotation from the Virgin Atlantic17 decision at the 
beginning of this Article. 
This Article’s second major contribution is to answer two developing 
criticisms of loyalty discounts that have the potential to turn into antiloyalty 
judicial maxims.  The first of these is that loyalty discounts need not be—
and often are not—true discounts, but rather disloyalty penalties.  This 
claim is economically implausible since it would have the seller giving the 
buyer a choice of accepting either a price above the profit-maximizing 
monopoly level or else an onerous contractual term, which would be akin to 
a price above the profit-maximizing monopoly level.  Either scenario would 
effectively cause the monopolist to exceed the profit-maximizing monopoly 
price and hence be unprofitable.  The second criticism of loyalty discounts 
is that they soften competition between sellers—essentially that they 
facilitate supracompetitive seller pricing even without excluding any seller 
from the market.  Part II shows that the assumptions underlying this claim 
are restrictive and not generalizable.  
This Article’s final major contribution, made in Part III, is to reorient 
the conversation away from an assumption that loyalty incentives are seller-
initiated strategies.  Rather, the available evidence suggests that loyalty 
incentives are often bargaining chips in negotiations between sellers and 
buyers—invoked by customers as often as suppliers in return for other 
concessions.  Thinking about loyalty incentives as bargaining chips does 
not dispel the possibility that such provisions can have exclusionary effects, 
but it does suggest that courts should be cautious about discouraging the use 
of loyalty incentives, which may take away a chip that buyers could 
otherwise invoke to improve their position. 
I. Foundational Considerations 
A. Loyalty and Volume 
Loyalty provisions come in a variety of forms.  The strongest form is a 
pure exclusive dealing agreement in which the buyer promises to buy all of 
its requirements from the supplier and not to purchase from any other 
supplier.18  Short of this, contracts sometimes contain partial exclusive 
dealing clauses that commit the buyer to make a specified level or 
 
17. Virgin Atl. Airways v. British Airways Plc, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001). 
18. See generally 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1821a2 (3d ed. 2011) (contrasting the stringent nature of 
exclusive dealing with market share discounts and market share dealing requirements). 
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percentage of its purchases from the seller.19  Often sellers seek to induce 
loyalty rather than to require it.  Loyalty inducement provisions also take a 
good many forms, but their common denominator is an option on the 
buyer’s part to secure a better price by demonstrating greater loyalty.  Two 
common forms are market share discounts and bundled discounts. 
Bundled discounts offer a buyer a better price for purchasing minimum 
amounts of the seller’s product across two or more separate product lines.20  
For example, in one of the leading recent bundled discount cases, the 
conglomerate manufacturer 3M offered retailers rebates that were 
conditioned on the retailer making minimum purchases on six of 3M’s 
product lines, including Health Care Products, Home Care Products, Home 
Improvement Products, Stationery Products, Retail Auto Products, and 
Leisure Time.21  Unlike a single-product volume discount, the customer can 
only achieve bundled discounts or rebates by demonstrating loyalty in a 
number of separate buckets of purchases. 
Although bundled discounts partake of many of the attributes of 
single-product loyalty discounts, they add significant complexities.  
Bundled discounts create different kinds of exclusionary effects—
particularly the potential to exclude rivals that do not sell the dominant 
firm’s full product line.22  They also may exhibit different sorts of 
efficiencies or procompetitive justifications—such as the potential to 
eliminate double marginalization23—that would not generally be true of 
single-product loyalty discounts.24  Further, bundled discounts raise unique 
theoretical questions about the plausibility of a dominant firm’s 
exclusionary strategy—such as whether it would be rational for a firm to 
use a bundled discount to leverage market power in one market to obtain a 
monopoly in a second market in light of the fact that raising the price in the 
second market might reduce sales in the first market if the two goods are 
 
19. See Tom et al., supra note 14, at 621–22. 
20. See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 
EMORY L.J. 423, 425 (2006) (introducing the economics of bundled discounting).  See generally 
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009) (discussing the exclusionary potential of bundled discounts); 
Herbert Hovenkamp & Erik Hovenkamp, Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust Policy, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 1227 (2009) (analyzing a variety of bundling practices and concluding that some 
should be considered anticompetitive); Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying 
and Bundled Discounting, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 909 (2011) (responding to and critiquing Elhauge’s 
proposed liability rule and arguments regarding the effects of tying). 
21. LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
22. See Crane, supra note 20, at 443–47. 
23. Id. at 434–36; Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and 
Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 958–61 (2010). 
24. But see Sreya Kolay et al., All-Units Discounts in Retail Contracts, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 429, 434–35 (2004) (discussing the potential of even single-product market share 
discounts to eliminate double marginalization). 
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complements.25  Because of these significant distinctions, bundled 
discounts merit separate consideration from single-product market share or 
other loyalty discounts and are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Market share discounts are the paradigmatic single-product loyalty 
incentive.  They operate by granting the buyer a better price if it purchases 
specified percentages of its requirements from the seller.26  Market share 
discounts are sometimes graduated—for example, a buyer receives a 5% 
discount for purchasing 60% or more of its requirements from the seller, a 
7% discount for purchasing 75% or more, and a 9% discount for purchasing 
90% or more.  Also, market share discounts may apply only to incremental 
dollars (i.e., to all purchases above 60%) or retroactively to the first 
dollar.27  A loyalty discount can be given instantaneously at the point of 
sale or rebated at some later time, such as at year’s end. 
How loyalty discounts are structured is often significant in 
determining whether they can have exclusionary effects.  For example, 
first-dollar rebates are usually considered more problematic than 
incremental-dollar discounts, since smaller rivals of the seller have to 
compete against price concessions given across a far greater swath of 
sales.28  Contracts with claw-back features, where the seller grants the buyer 
 
25. See Elhauge, supra note 20, at 403–19.  The Chicago School of economic analysis argued 
that it would be irrational for a firm with a monopoly in market A to attempt to leverage its power 
into a complementary market B, since increasing the price of one product leads to a diminution in 
the demand for its complements.  Hence, by leveraging monopoly power and attempting to extract 
a second monopoly profit, the dominant firm would simply be cannibalizing its own profits in the 
leveraging market.  See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 372–75, 380–81 (1978) (arguing that there is no reason for a firm with one monopoly to try 
to use tying to extract a second monopoly profit); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197–99 
(2d ed. 2001) (contending that tying will not allow the firm to gain a second monopoly in the case 
of either complementary or unrelated goods); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the 
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20–23 (1957) (concluding that a firm is unable to extract a 
second monopoly profit because any price increase to one good must be offset by a corresponding 
decrease in the other good); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade 
Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290–92 (1956) (proposing that any attempt to impose 
coercive restrictions on customers will be successful only if the price that would be charged 
without the restriction is reduced).  Elhauge argues that the one-monopoly-profit theory 
overlooked a number of ways in which leverage could be profitable.  Elhauge, supra note 20, at 
403–19. 
26. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 1611, 1649–50 (2010).  A variation on a market share requirement is a retail-
shelf-placement requirement.  In Church & Dwight Co. v. Mayer Labs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 876, 
887 (N.D. Cal.), vacated in part, No. C-10-4429 EMC, 2012 WL 1745592 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 
2012), for example, a condom manufacturer granted retailers different levels of rebates for 
maintaining its products in various percentages of the retailer’s shelf space dedicated to condoms: 
“[A] 55% tier (awarding a 4.0% rebate for 55% or more of a retail chain’s display space), a 65% 
tier (awarding a 7% rebate for 65% or more of the display space), and a 70% tier (awarding a 
7.5% rebate for 70% or more of the display space).” 
27. See Jacobson, supra note 14, at 1–2; Duncan & McCormac, supra note 14, at 134. 
28. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Towards a Consistent Antitrust Policy for Unilateral Conduct, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2009, art. 3, at 1, 6, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
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a favorable price on the assumption that it will meet a loyalty threshold, 
subject to a repayment obligation in the event the buyer does not meet the 
threshold, may create particular antitrust risks insofar as buyers may be 
loath to run the risk of incurring large lump-sum penalties at year’s end and 
hence remain strictly loyal to the seller.29 
One of the frequently discussed questions with respect to market share 
discounts is why a seller who wants to reward high-volume customers 
should not simply offer a traditional volume discount.30  Before getting to 
some of the answers, it is worth noting that sometimes volume and loyalty 
discounting is substantively equivalent.  Volume discounts and loyalty 
discounts can be identical in operation.  Suppose, for example, that the 
buyer has a stable need for one hundred tons of salt per year.  If the seller 
offers the buyer a 5% price reduction for buying eighty tons of salt or 80% 
of its salt requirements per year, the effect on the buyer’s incentives will be 
identical assuming its buying needs stay constant.31 
On the other hand, market share discounts often differ from volume 
discounts in significant ways.  In several circumstances, market share 
discounts may be more advantageous to the buyer than volume discounts. 
First, market share discounts have the effect of shifting risks of 
changing market circumstances from buyers to sellers in ways that volume 
 
dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb09_SourceFull2_26f.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining that 
“‘first dollar’ discounts[] may provide especially strong inducements—in some instances, outright 
coercion—because they apply not only to the contested volume but to all of the customer’s 
purchases, enhancing a loss if the percentage commitment is not fulfilled”); Robert H. Lande, 
Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 863, 
863–64 (“Unlike ‘regular’ discounts, which are almost always procompetitive, retroactive 
discounts have a strong exclusionary and anticompetitive potential.”). 
29. See Jacobson, supra note 28.  Allegations about claw-back provisions have been at issue 
in some recent loyalty discount cases.  See, e.g., Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 
617 (8th Cir. 2011). 
30. See, e.g., Evaluating the Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing Agreements, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Nov. 2005, art. 2, at 1, 6, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Nov05_FullSource11_29.authcheckdam.pdf (“[W]hy reward 
your best customers with a ‘loyalty’ discount?  Why not do it instead through a less restrictive 
alternative like a volume discount?”).  On the distinction between market share and volume 
discounts, see ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 265 n.6 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3B ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 768b4 (3d ed. 2008)). 
31. A case in point is then-Judge Breyer’s decision in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell 
Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983), which involved the market for snubbers, safety devices used 
in nuclear power plants.  The defendant offered a major customer a large discount if it would 
agree to purchase large quantities of snubbers, amounting to a large share of its expected 
purchases, over a two-year period.  Id. at 228–29.  Since the customer’s snubber needs were stable 
and predictable, it probably would have made little difference if the supplier made the discount 
contingent on loyalty or volume.  See id. at 229 (noting that the customer was able to predict its 
needs two years in advance and that its snubber needs were identical for both years). 
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discounts do not.32  For example, Herbert Hovenkamp has explained Intel’s 
market share discounts as a means of shifting the risk of a weakening 
market from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) like Dell and HP to 
Intel.33  If the computer market weakens more than expected, Dell and HP 
might not be able to meet a contractually specified volume threshold and 
hence might lose a volume-based discount.  However, if to obtain Intel’s 
lowest price they must just buy a specified percentage of their central 
processing unit needs from Intel—say 80%—they can continue to claim the 
best price even in a weak computer market. 
Second, and in the same vein, market share discounts may be used to 
guarantee the supplier a minimum volume of sales when the requirements 
of a group of customers are unpredictable.34  To stay with the computer 
industry, suppose that Intel will be able to optimize its planning and achieve 
economies of scale if it knows that it will sell at least one million central 
processing units (CPUs) in the coming year.  Although it makes a fairly 
strong prediction that the total volume of CPU sales in the market will be 
around two million, the OEMs are engaged in a fierce market share battle of 
their own, and the CPU requirements of any individual OEM are hard to 
determine given the vagaries of the market.  Intel may identify a group of 
OEMs that are likely to purchase around 1.25 million collectively, although 
the distribution of purchases within the group is uncertain.  If each of the 
OEMs in this group agrees to purchase 80% of its requirements from Intel, 
Intel can count on making a million CPU sales in the coming year from this 
group of customers.  From Intel’s perspective, it is beneficial to offer a 
discount in exchange for a market share commitment so that Intel can plan 
on the level of sales it will make in the coming year and perhaps optimize 
its production facilities.  From the OEMs’ perspective, the deal is also 
beneficial.  The OEMs secure a more favorable price and one that does not 
 
32. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 871, 889 (2010).  Hovenkamp explained that a seller like Intel uses market share discounts 
rather than volume discounts in order to shift the costs of market downturns from its customers to 
itself, writing: 
A quantity discount attaches to a specified number of chips, and if the market 
becomes weak and the computer maker’s sales fall below that number, the computer 
maker must pay the higher price.  By contrast, a market share discount attaches to, 
say, 90% of the buyer’s sales, whatever they happen to be.  So the market share 
discount offers the computer maker the lower price, even if the market becomes 
weak, provided that the computer maker purchases its requisite percentage of chips 
from the seller. 
Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Cf. Jacobson, supra note 14, at 3 (“A supplier can offer volume discounts or other price 
concessions, without loyalty commitments, to generate volume to account for high fixed costs.”). 
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require them to commit to a volume of purchases they may be unable to 
meet.35 
Third, market share discounts may enable even relatively small buyers 
who might not qualify for a volume discount to enhance their bargaining 
position with suppliers and exact pricing concessions.  This occurs because 
the buyer is able to exchange its freedom to pursue variety in its purchases 
for a lower price.  By forgoing its variety preferences and focusing on a 
single seller, the buyer effectively elasticizes the demand facing the seller 
and, hence, can obtain a better price.36  Developing this model, Ben Klein 
and Kevin Murphy consider the example of packaged-food manufacturers 
competing for retail shelf space.37  Each manufacturer would like to secure 
the most shelf space possible for its products.  Retailers are much less 
interested than the manufacturer as to which brand of spices gets 
precedence on their shelves.38  They are competing against other retailers to 
create the optimal basket of product selection, price, and service.39  The 
retailer essentially acts as a bargaining agent for the interests of its 
customers, trading off different characteristics.  When the retailer commits 
to partial or exclusive shelf-space loyalty to a particular brand, it will 
disappoint some customers who would prefer access to a different brand.40  
But, by forgoing customers’ variety preferences, the retailer elasticizes the 
demand facing the manufacturer.41  This, in turn, allows the retailer to 
obtain better wholesale prices and pass them along to customers as better 
retail prices.42  Although it entails some loss of consumer surplus—the 
customers who had strong variety preferences—the aggregate consumer 
welfare effects due to the lower prices can be significantly positive.43  
Significantly, Klein and Murphy’s model shows how even relatively small 
purchasers with little buying power can deploy loyalty to secure better 
prices.44 
 
35. This effect could be realized even if the buyers do not commit ex ante to purchase 80% of 
their requirements from the seller but the seller expects that the offer of discount if they do will 
incentivize them to purchase the 80% share.  Commitment is just a strong form of expectation. 
36. Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for 
Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 433, 444–45 (2008). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 438. 
39. Id. at 443. 
40. See id. at 451. 
41. See id. at 444. 
42. Id. at 451. 
43. See id. 
44. Id. at 449 (noting that “significantly lower wholesale prices can be achieved by retailers 
with relatively small market shares as long as the retailer has the ability to influence the share of 
its customers’ purchases in a product category that is obtained by a chosen manufacturer”).  At 
least one federal court has recognized this benefit of market share discounts, without exploring the 
economic rationale.  See Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 864–
65  (6th Cir. 2007) (“Market-share discounts theoretically level the playing field by allowing 
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Loyal behavior by buyers can have similar properties to the preferred 
shelf-space commitments discussed by Klein and Murphy.  Imagine a 
small, regional hospital that needs to purchase catheters.  Assume that there 
are four major catheter suppliers and that catheters are somewhat 
differentiated products.  The nurses and other medical professionals who 
administer catheters have idiosyncratic preferences for different brands.  If 
each hospital ward or unit makes its own purchasing decision, the hospital 
will end up using all four brands.  Suppose, however, that hospital 
procurement administrators decide to cut costs by centralizing the hospital’s 
purchasing decisions.  One effect of this is to increase the volume the 
hospital can use as leverage in any purchasing negotiation.  But even 
consolidating all of the hospital’s buying power may not secure the hospital 
much leverage.  By committing to loyalty—for example, deciding to buy 
85% of its catheter requirements from a single manufacturer—the hospital 
elasticizes the demand facing the manufacturers.  Nurses may no longer 
have as easy access to their preferred brand of catheter, but the overall 
effect on composite patient pricing and quality may be positive. 
An obvious objection to this and the shelf-space illustrations is that 
loyalty discounts secure lower prices at the expense of individuals with 
idiosyncratic needs or preferences45—the gourmet cook who highly values 
a particular brand of spice or the neonatal unit nurse who believes that a 
particular brand of catheter is optimal for her patients’ needs.  Part of the 
answer—already told—is that many purchasing decisions made by 
intermediaries or agents on behalf of others necessarily involve trade-offs 
between price, variety, quality, and convenience.  The other part of the 
answer is that the use of commercial loyalty devices need not result in 
complete homogenization of the available product offering.  As already 
discussed—and discussed further below—market share discounts are often 
partial, providing for the purchase by the buyer of a large portion, but not 
all, of its requirements.46  One of the reasons that many loyalty discounts 
are set at 80% or 85% is to allow some room for the buyer, agent, or 
intermediary to honor the variety preferences of the most variety-preferring 
principals (such as nurses or grocery shoppers).  Of course, committing a 
lower percentage in order to preserve the preferences of the principals with 
 
competing purchasers of like commodities to participate on equal terms, regardless of size, 
because such discounts depend not on volume purchases, but on the percentage of purchases of a 
particular category of products.”); see also Donald Hawthorne & Margaret Sanderson, Rigorous 
Analysis of Economic Evidence on Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, 
at 55, 59 (recognizing that Tyco’s market share discounts for pulse oximetry items allowed small 
hospitals to achieve lower prices than they could under pure volume discounts). 
45. This objection would track an assertion sometimes made about the goals of antitrust 
enforcement—that antitrust law exists to achieve not only lower prices and increased quality, but 
also enhanced variety.  See, e.g., Thomas B. Leary, The Significance of Variety in Antitrust 
Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 1007, 1009–11 (2001). 
46. See supra text accompanying notes 19–27. 
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the most inelastic demand diminishes the elasticizing effect of committing 
to loyalty.  But it is these kinds of trade-off decisions that intermediaries 
and agents routinely make.47 
B. Current Legal Treatment 
Single-product loyalty inducements have been recently challenged in 
both the United States and the European Union as exclusionary or 
otherwise anticompetitive devices.  In the United States, they have been 
principally challenged as restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act,48 monopolizing devices in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,49 
exclusive dealing agreements under Section 3 of the Clayton Act,50 price 
discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act,51 or violations of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.52  In the European Union, 
they have been challenged as abridgements of Article 101 on the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),53 which prohibits 
restrictive agreements, and Article 102, which prohibits abuse of a 
dominant position.54  This Article will not discuss the potential differences 
between these separate legal theories within each legal regime, but will 
instead consider the overall treatment of loyalty provisions as a class. 
In recent years, loyalty provisions have received a generally hospitable 
welcome in U.S. courts, although not so much at the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).  Private challenges—usually by competitors—have 
alleged that loyalty discounts result in de facto exclusivity or semi-
exclusivity and foreclose smaller rivals’ opportunities to enter or expand in 
the market.  Such challenges in a variety of industries, including boat 
engines,55 medical devices,56 pharmaceuticals,57 automotive sandpaper,58 
 
47. See Klein & Murphy, supra note 36, at 454–57 (“Retailers . . . often will be forced by 
competition to minimize . . . consumer costs associated with exclusivity by modifying their offers 
of complete exclusivity with the use of partial exclusivity arrangements that provide consumers 
who have a strong preference for a particular brand the opportunity to purchase that brand.”). 
48. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
49. Id. § 2. 
50. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012). 
51. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012). 
52. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
53. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47. 
54. Id. art. 102. 
55. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000). 
56. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 611, 617–18 (8th Cir. 2011); Allied 
Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2010). 
57. J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., Nos. 1:01-CV-704, 1:03-CV-781, 2005 WL 
1396940, at *2, *21–22 (S.D. Ohio June 13, 2005). 
58. NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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wholesale tobacco,59 condoms,60 and airline travel,61 have generally met 
with failure.  Plaintiffs have succeeded in a few cases.62  Some courts have 
held that loyalty discounts are price concessions that are not illegal unless 
they result in the dominant firm pricing below an appropriate measure of 
cost.63  Since below-cost pricing is difficult to establish given contemporary 
U.S. antitrust jurisprudence, most such challenges have failed.64  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has not yet heard a loyalty discount case, and U.S. antitrust 
jurisprudence has not settled on a consistent, unified approach to the 
problem. 
A brief discussion of the two cases mentioned in the introduction—
Virgin Atlantic and Intel Corp.65—will illustrate these issues and provide 
some contrast and comparison to the European treatment of loyalty 
discounts.66 
Virgin Atlantic arose from one of the many chapters in Sir Richard 
Branson’s war to break British Airways (BA)’s dominance in transatlantic 
travel.  Virgin entered the transatlantic market in the mid-1980s and soon 
grew to be a serious competitor to other major U.S.–London carriers, 
 
59. See Smith Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F. App’x 398, 408–09 (6th Cir. 
2007) (rejecting wholesale retailers’ claims that Philip Morris’s discount-pricing structure 
effectively prohibited them from taking advantage of the best cost savings); Smith Wholesale Co. 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 864–65, 880  (6th Cir. 2007) (same for R.J. 
Reynolds’s discount-pricing structure). 
60. Church & Dwight Co. v. Mayer Labs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 876, 887, 918 (N.D. Cal. 
2012). 
61. Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Plc, 257 F.3d 256, 259, 273 (2d Cir. 2001). 
62. Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., 350 F. App’x 95, 97–98 (9th Cir. 2009); 
ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692–93 (D. Del. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012); Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int’l, Ltd., No. 
1:05-CV-12024-PBS, 2009 WL 4061631, at *3, *6 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 2009); United States v. 
Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.A. 99–005(SLR), 2006 WL 2612167, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 26, 2006); 
see infra text accompanying notes 95–102 (discussing FTC’s action against, and subsequent 
settlement with, Intel).  A group of plaintiffs, dealers of artificial teeth, were also successful in 
another case involving Dentsply International, United States v. Dentsply International, Inc., 399 
F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), though that case involved pure exclusive dealing and not loyalty 
discounting.  Id. at 184. 
63. See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that discounted prices above average variable cost maintain a strong presumption of 
legality). 
64. See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 & 
n.10, 6 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court has not resolved circuit splits regarding the best 
way to identify when a price is below cost and recognizing the mainstream view that some of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions “have made it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to win predatory 
pricing cases”). 
65. 150 F.T.C. 420 (2010). 
66. A brief discussion of the treatment of loyalty discounts or rebates outside the United 
States and European Union can be found in EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL 
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 693–94 (2d ed. 2011). 
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particularly American Airlines and British Airways.67  In the mid-1980s, 
partly in response to competition from Virgin, British Airways introduced a 
series of incentive plans targeted at travel agents and corporate buyers.68  
Although some of the incentives were based on volume (how much revenue 
a travel agent pushed in BA’s direction), others were based on market 
share—BA’s percentage share of the U.S.–U.K. flights booked by the 
agent.69  The discounts were typically “back-to-dollar-one,” meaning that 
when a customer reached the target threshold, it received a discounted price 
on earlier purchases.70  Virgin brought suit, alleging that the incentive 
agreements, along with BA’s ability to prevent Virgin from obtaining 
desired slots at London’s Heathrow Airport, were part of an anticompetitive 
scheme to slow Virgin’s growth as a competitor.71 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted 
summary judgment for BA72 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed.73  It first found that Virgin’s Sherman Act Section 1 
claims failed because Virgin failed to show an “actual adverse effect” on 
consumer welfare.74  It then affirmed the dismissal of Virgin’s attempted 
monopolization claim, stating that Virgin failed to show that the incentive 
agreements resulted in BA pricing airline tickets below cost—a requirement 
for predatory pricing claims.75  In passing, it made the offhand statement 
quoted at the beginning of this Article: “These kinds of agreements allow 
firms to reward their most loyal customers.  Rewarding customer loyalty 
promotes competition on the merits.”76 
The European Commission,77 General Court,78 and European Court of 
Justice (ECJ)79 reached a very different conclusion on the same facts.  In 
 
67. Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Plc, 257 F.3d 256, 259–61 (2d Cir. 2001); see 
Jeff Mosteller, The Current and Future Climate of Airline Consolidation: The Possible Impact of 
an Alliance of Two Large Airlines and an Examination of the Proposed American Airlines-British 
Airways Alliance, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 575, 588–89 (1999) (implying that American Airlines and 
British Airways had the most to lose from increased transatlantic competition because they 
collectively controlled 60% of the U.S.–U.K. market). 
68. Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Plc, 69 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999), aff’d, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001). 
69. Id. at 575. 
70. Virgin Atl., 257 F.3d at 261. 
71. Id. at 259. 
72. Virgin Atl., 69 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
73. Virgin Atl., 257 F.3d at 259. 
74. Id. at 264–65. 
75. Id. at 265–69. 
76. Id. at 265. 
77. Commission Decision of 14 July 1999 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 30) 1, 23. 
78. Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, II-6002, [2004] 4 
C.M.L.R. 19, at 1060–61. 
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two prior cases, Hoffmann-La Roche80 and Michelin,81 the ECJ had adopted 
a presumption that discounts or rebates offered by dominant firms to induce 
customer loyalty were incompatible with the predecessor to Articles 101 
and 102 of the TFEU.82  In British Airways,83 the court found that the 
incentives were prima facie anticompetitive because they had the effect of 
inducing loyalty to a dominant firm.84  The court did not cite evidence of 
actual anticompetitive effects in the sense of higher consumer prices or 
diminished output, finding that evidence of actual anticompetitive effects 
was unnecessary.85  Rather, in keeping with ECJ precedents, it focused on 
the generic exclusionary potential of the loyalty rebates when exercised by 
dominant undertakings.86 
Having found the incentive rebates to be suspect fidelity-building 
devices, the court then considered whether BA had offered an “objective 
economic justification” sufficient to overcome the prima facie presumption 
of illegality.87  BA argued that the rebates were objectively justified 
because they helped BA fill empty airplane seats and hence contributed 
toward lowering its high fixed operational costs.88  The ECJ affirmed the 
General Court’s rejection of this argument, essentially finding that only 
direct cost savings from the loyalty program were the kinds of objective 
economic justifications sufficient to overcome the presumption of illegality 
for the deployment of fidelity discounts by dominant firms.89 
The Intel case followed on the heels of British Airways.  The computer 
CPU market has been essentially a duopoly since the 1990s, with Intel 
 
79. Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, I-2424, [2007] 4 
C.M.L.R. 22, at 1015. 
80. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 
211. 
81. Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 
3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282. 
82. See id. at 3514–15, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, at 330–31; Hoffmann-La Roche & Co., 1979 
E.C.R. at 539–40, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, at 289–90. 
83. Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 22. 
84. Id. at I-2401–02, [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 22, at 1002 (affirming the General Court’s finding 
that “the bonus schemes at issue had a fidelity-building effect capable of producing an 
exclusionary effect”). 
85. Id. at I-2385, I-2399, [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 22, at 993–94, 1000–01 (“[I]t was not necessary 
to demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned.”). 
86. Id., [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 22, at 993–94. 
87. Id. at I-2400, [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 22, at 1001. 
88. Id. at I-2403–04, [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 22, at 1003. 
89. See id. at I-2404–06, [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 22, at 1003–04 (affirming the General Court’s 
judgment and approving its economic-justification analysis); Case T-219/99, British Airways plc 
v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, II-5995–96, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 19, at 1056–57 (rejecting BA’s 
argument that its loyalty discounts were economically justified because it used the proceeds from 
extra ticket sales to cover its fixed operational costs and stating that those discounts “cannot be 
regarded as constituting the consideration for efficiency gains or cost savings resulting from the 
sale of BA tickets”). 
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controlling roughly 80% and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) controlling 
the other 15% to 20%.90  In the late 1990s, Intel began to offer OEMs 
financial incentives to purchase specified levels of their CPU 
requirements—typically around 80% or 85%—from Intel.91  AMD 
complained that these loyalty rebates slowed its market share growth and 
starved it of the capital needed to invest in developing new products.92  
From the early 2000s, and continuing to some degree until the present, 
AMD and Intel waged a global antitrust war over the legal treatment of 
Intel’s loyalty discounts.  To summarize the headlines briefly, AMD 
secured early decisions against Intel in Japan and Korea, a favorable 
decision and €1.06 billion (almost $1.5 billion) fine against Intel from the 
European Commission, a $1.25 billion settlement payment from Intel, and a 
complaint from the Federal Trade Commission that Intel quickly settled.93 
Although we have not yet heard the final word from Europe,94 the Intel 
case seems to suggest some provisional and fragile rapprochement between 
the U.S. and EU treatment of loyalty discounts—at least at the level of 
public enforcement.  For its part, the European Commission seemed to back 
away from the view expressed in Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin, and 
British Airways that loyalty discounts by dominant firms should be treated 
as prima facie illegal and only permitted if the dominant firm can overcome 
the high hurdle of proving marginal cost efficiencies.  The key turn came in 
a December 2008 “Guidance Paper” on the application of Article 102’s 
prohibition on abuse of dominance, in which the Commission staff 
suggested determining whether loyalty discounts are anticompetitive using 
a modified predatory pricing analysis, similar to what some U.S. courts and 
agencies have suggested.95  The European antitrust community has 
 
90. See Daniel A. Crane & Graciela Miralles, Toward a Unified Theory of Exclusionary 
Vertical Restraints, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 647–49 (2011) (providing a brief overview of AMD 
and Intel’s competitive history). 
91. See 2009 Commission Decision Summary, supra note 12, at 14 (detailing some of Intel’s 
loyalty rebate agreements); Crane & Miralles, supra note 90, at 648. 
92. Crane & Miralles, supra note 90, at 648–49. 
93. Id. at 646–47. 
94. As of this writing, the General Court has conducted a hearing on Intel’s appeal for an 
annulment of the fine, but has yet to deliver a ruling.  See Action Brought on 22 July 2009—Intel 
v. Commission, 2009 O.J. (C 220) 41 (setting forth Intel’s application for annulment); see also 
Case Information for T-286/09, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur= 
C,T,F&num=t-286/09&td=ALL (follow the “case information” hyperlink) (indicating that an 
opinion has not been delivered for the hearing held on July 6, 2012). 
95. Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, 7–20.  The Commission’s analysis was similar to that in a 
contemporaneous report on monopolization released by the U.S. Justice Department.  See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 
OF THE SHERMAN ACT 106–17 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/ 
236681.pdf.  Three commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission criticized the Justice 
Department’s report as too protective of dominant firms.  See PAMELA JONES HARBOUR, JON 
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understood the Guidance Paper as reflecting a movement in the 
Commission away from a form-based analysis and toward an effects-based 
or functional-economic analysis.96  In its prohibition decision, the 
Commission began by invoking the “form-based” precedents (Hoffmann-
La Roche, Michelin, and British Airways) but then conducted an effects-
based, modified-predation analysis to conclude that Intel’s loyalty rebates 
had an exclusionary effect on AMD, and hence on competition.97 
A few months after the Commission decision, the FTC brought its own 
action against Intel.98  If the Europeans had moved a few yards in the 
American direction, the Americans moved a few feet in the European 
direction.  Consistent with U.S. predatory pricing precedent, the 
Commission alleged that Intel’s rebates would have forced AMD to price 
below cost in order to compete.99  However, the Commission also gave 
notice that it intended to push the boundaries of traditional, prodefendant 
predatory pricing law as applied to loyalty discounts.  First, the 
Commission’s complaint alleged that the measure of cost below which Intel 
priced included “average variable cost plus an appropriate level of 
contribution towards sunk costs.”100  Since most U.S. courts consider only 
variable or marginal costs in predatory pricing cases,101 this was a direct 
challenge to the application of a predatory pricing model in bundled 
discount cases.102  Second, the complaint alleged that, while the 
 
LEIBOWITZ & J. THOMAS ROSCH, FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS 
HARBOUR, LEIBOWITZ AND ROSCH ON THE ISSUANCE OF THE SECTION 2 REPORT BY THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/ 
080908section2stmt.pdf (decrying the Justice Department’s report as a “blueprint for radically 
weakened enforcement of Section 2”).  The Obama Antitrust Division withdrew the report in one 
of its first official acts.  See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report 
on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/ 
2009/245710.htm (“Withdrawing the Section 2 report is a shift in philosophy and the clearest way 
to let everyone know that the Antitrust Division will be aggressively pursuing cases where 
monopolists try to use their dominance in the marketplace to stifle competition and harm 
consumers.”). 
96. See Neelie Kroes, Member in Charge of Competition Policy, European Comm’n, Speech 
at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, at 
2 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-537_en.pdf 
(advocating an effects-based approach to Article 82 enforcement and indicating that part of the 
purpose of her speech was to clarify the Commission’s Article 82 policy, as stated in its policy 
papers). 
97. See 2009 Commission Decision Summary, supra note 12, at 15 & n.1, 16; Crane & 
Miralles, supra note 90, at 648–49 (describing the Commission’s approach). 
98. Intel Complaint, supra note 12. 
99. Id. ¶ 53. 
100. Id. 
101. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 3A ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 30, ¶¶ 739–740 (detailing the 
marginal-cost and average-variable-cost metrics of below-cost determinations). 
102. Daniel A. Crane, Predation Analysis and the FTC’s Case Against Intel 2–4 (Univ. of 
Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 202, 2010), 
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Commission was prepared to show that Intel was able to recoup its costs of 
giving loyalty discounts through supracompetitive pricing, recoupment 
should not be a mandatory element of an FTC case challenging loyalty 
discounts.103  Since recoupment is an element of a predatory pricing case,104 
this statement also signaled the FTC’s intention to move away from 
restrictive predation rules and analogies and toward a more interventionist 
approach toward loyalty discounts.  Whether or not these theories would 
ultimately have held up the Intel case cannot inform us, since Intel settled 
with the Commission a few months later.105 
If Intel signals some convergence between the views of the current 
European Commission and FTC, it does little to settle the issue in the courts 
where, when push comes to shove, the issue may ultimately be resolved.  At 
a doctrinal level, the treatment of loyalty discounts remains polarized, with 
U.S. courts sometimes following a strict predatory pricing approach that 
plaintiffs (whether private or governmental) will find hard to meet106 and 
the official doctrine of the EU courts remaining hostile to loyalty discounts 
by dominant firms.107  In the meanwhile, academic commentators continue 
to develop new theories about the value and threats of loyalty,108 and 
private litigants continue to press their cases in the lower courts in the 
United States.109 
C. Prior Beliefs, Legal Catechisms, and the Formation of Antitrust 
Standards 
As noted above, the law governing loyalty discounts remains 
unsettled.  European law has not caught up with the dramatic shift from a 
form-based approach to an effects-based approach tentatively proposed by 
the Commission.110  Some U.S. courts have moved in the direction of 
predatory pricing rules for loyalty discounts, but many of the conservative 
assumptions in these cases are under attack in academic literature, and the 
Supreme Court has not yet weighed in.111  Most of the contests over loyalty 
 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1617364 (examining ways in 
which the FTC’s proposed cost definition faced difficulties given prevailing legal standards). 
103. Intel Complaint, supra note 12, ¶ 53. 
104. Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) 
(“The second prerequisite to holding a competitor liable under the antitrust laws for charging low 
prices is a demonstration that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”). 
105. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Modified Intel Settlement Order 
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/intel.shtm. 
106. See Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Plc, 257 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir. 2001). 
107. See 2009 Commission Decision Summary, supra note 12, at 15. 
108. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 55–62. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 94–97. 
111. See supra notes 14, 64 and accompanying text. 
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discounts have occurred in the last decade, which, in the glacial movement 
of antitrust law, is relatively little time in which to form durable rules.  The 
antitrust law of loyalty remains up for grabs. 
Understanding the likely evolution of antitrust law concerning loyalty 
discounts requires some brief observations as to how modern antitrust law 
is formed in U.S. courts.  Although predicated on statutes, antitrust law 
evolves in an essentially common law manner, as likely intended by its 
legislative framers.112  That is to say, judges announce principles based on 
analogies from precedent but relatively unconstrained by external sources 
such as deterministic statutory language,113 threats of congressional action 
to overrule unpopular results,114 or agency rulemaking entitled to some 
degree of judicial deference.115  Modern antitrust case law development, if 
not exactly free-form, is as free from external constraints as any area of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
When the Supreme Court decides antitrust cases, it of course adopts 
rules, or multifactor standards.116  But these legally structured liability 
determinants are often less important to the decision of future cases than the 
 
112. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) 
(“Congress . . . did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the 
statute or its application in concrete situations.  The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that 
[Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on 
common-law tradition.”); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 103d2 (4th ed. 2013) (stating 
that the Sherman Act “invest[ed] the federal courts with a jurisdiction to create and develop an 
‘antitrust law’ in the manner of the common law courts”); William F. Baxter, Separation of 
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEXAS L. 
REV. 661, 663 (1982) (“Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has 
permitted a common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most 
general statutory directions.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 
544 (1983) (“The statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that 
effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”). 
113. See BORK, supra note 25, at 409 (describing the “open-textured” nature of the antitrust 
laws). 
114. In the modern era, Congress has shown little interest in overturning Supreme Court 
antitrust precedents, as it has done in many other statutory areas.  Following the Court’s decision 
in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), which jettisoned a 
nearly century-old rule of per se illegality for resale price maintenance, id. at 881–82, there were 
congressional threats of a legislative override.  Leegin override legislation has passed committees 
in both houses of Congress, but has thus far failed to gain traction in the full Congress.  
Gregory T. Gundlach, Overview and Contents of the Special Issue: Antitrust Analysis of Resale 
Price Maintenance after Leegin, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 15 (2010); Victor Vital & Elizabeth 
Wirmani, Leegin: All Bark, No Bite?, FRANCHISE LAW., Summer 2010, http://apps.american 
bar.org/abapubs/design/franlwy/sum10/7_Leegin.html. 
115. The Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission have rarely promulgated 
substantive antitrust rules.  See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 
1159, 1199 (2008) (“Like the Antitrust Division [of the Justice Department], the FTC has little 
power to create antitrust norms but merely enforces the norms created by the generalist Article III 
courts . . . .”). 
116. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (articulating the 
three-factor test for proving attempted monopolization). 
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atmospheric maxims or legal–economic catechisms that the Court 
announces in the course of adjudication.117  These maxims, which since the 
Chicago School revolution of the 1970s have increasingly been drawn from 
economic theory,118 announce a set of baseline perspectives, or Bayesian 
prior beliefs, about the competitive practice under consideration.  Their 
repetition in future cases serves as a grounding exercise to orient the 
Court’s thinking and justify its decision. 
The best example of this, and the one most relevant to loyalty 
discounting, is predatory pricing.  In the pre-Chicago era, the courts and 
antitrust agencies often viewed aggressive price discounting by dominant 
firms with suspicion.119  Aggressive price cutting fell into what the Nobel 
laureate Oliver Williamson once referred to as antitrust’s “inhospitability 
tradition.”120  The ascendant Chicago School, however, largely dismissed 
the predation theories and argued for far greater tolerance toward unilateral 
price competition.121  Over time, the Supreme Court radically altered the 
reception that unilateral price discounts received in the courts, essentially 
moving them into a hospitability tradition.122  It did this in part by 
announcing restrictive liability rules—the requirement of pricing below an 
appropriate measure of cost and the recoupment requirement.123  But the 
Court accomplished this revolution without investing much effort into 
fleshing out the content of the liability rules.  For example, it has still not 
 
117. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern 
Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733 & n.3, 734 (2012) (collecting criticisms 
of the Court’s initial invocations of the rule of reason as “uncertain” and “unstructured”). 
118. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. 
L. REV. 925 (1979) (describing the economic orientation of the Chicago School). 
119. The seminal pre-Chicago case is Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 
(1967), which condemned aggressive price competition without any showing of adverse 
anticompetitive effects, id. at 696–98. 
120. Oliver E. Williamson, Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics: Introduction, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 918, 920 (1979); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market 
Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 
959 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Vertical Market Restrictions] (claiming that the 
inhospitability tradition has a “preoccupation with (real or imagined) anticompetitive effects”).  
Williamson attributed this tradition to Donald Turner, then-Assistant Attorney General at the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, who was quoted as stating: “I approach 
territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably 
in the tradition of antitrust law.”  Williamson, Vertical Market Restrictions, supra (quoting N.Y. 
STATE BAR ASS’N, 1968 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 29 (1968) (remarks of Stanley Robinson)). 
121. See BORK, supra note 25, at 144–59 (critiquing predatory pricing theories and 
suggesting that predation is unlikely to be a serious problem); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory 
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 282–97 (1981) (dismissing predation 
strategies as unlikely to be attempted); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & 
ECON. 289, 292 (1980) (arguing that predatory price cutting is rare and generally an irrational 
business strategy). 
122. Crane, supra note 64, at 3–4. 
123. E.g., Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 
(1993). 
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decided what is the appropriate measure of cost in a predation case, an issue 
on which there has been a circuit split for several decades.124  Instead, the 
Court spent much of its time expounding atmospheric maxims about why 
predatory pricing was not likely to be a frequent threat to competition and 
why punishing it would threaten the welfare of consumers.  The litany is 
now often intoned catechistically in predation cases: “predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful”125 because 
“cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of 
competition . . . . [;] mistaken inferences . . . are especially costly, because 
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect;”126 
“[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and 
so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten 
competition.”127 
The power of these kinds of catechisms lies in their ability to direct a 
judge’s disposition toward such critical matters as allocations of burdens of 
proof; her willingness to dismiss cases, grant summary judgment, or 
otherwise relieve juries of cases; and the exercise of her Daubert128 
gatekeeping function as to expert testimony.  Predatory pricing cases have 
become hard to win not primarily because plaintiffs cannot come up with 
theories of below-cost pricing or recoupment, but because judges have 
generally begun with a Supreme Court-mandated prior belief that predatory 
pricing is an implausible theory that will often be invoked by inefficient, 
rent-seeking competitors that want to increase rather than decrease prices.129 
If antitrust law proceeds in large part by catechisms, these catechisms 
need not be uniformly in favor of dominant firms.  Throughout much of 
antitrust history, the currents have run the other way.130  The post-Chicago 
 
124. On three occasions, the Supreme Court has declined to decide what is the appropriate 
measure of cost for predatory pricing cases.  Id. at 222 n.1; Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 
479 U.S. 104, 117 n.12 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
584 n.8 (1986). 
125. This maxim was first intoned in Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589, and repeated in Cargill, 
479 U.S. at 121 n.17; 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 343 n.5 (1987); Brooke Group, 
509 U.S. at 226; and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 
323 (2007). 
126. This maxim was first intoned in Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594, and repeated in Cargill, 
479 U.S. at 121 n.17; Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226; Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004); and Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. 
Linkline Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009). 
127. This maxim was first intoned in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 
328, 340 (1990), and repeated in Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 
3, 15 (1997); Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 319; and Linkline, 555 U.S. at 451. 
128. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
129. See generally Crane, supra note 64 (discussing the jurisprudence and rationale of the 
Supreme Court in predatory pricing decisions). 
130. Until it was buried in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 35 
(2006), Justice Frankfurter’s maxim that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the 
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movement in antitrust law is beginning to make inroads in turning views of 
dominant firm practices from the hospitability tradition to at least neutral 
ground.131  This is where the rubber hits the road for loyalty discounts in the 
U.S. courts.  Post-Chicago theories are chipping away at the Chicago 
School maxims that justified nonintervention for unilateral pricing 
decisions by dominant firms.  As courts sift through these competing 
assertions, they will be looking to come up with not only new legal rules—
which may end up being as banal and nonpredictive as exclusive dealing 
law’s “substantial foreclosure” test132—but also with new maxims or 
catechisms that express the judiciary’s prior beliefs about the likelihood that 
loyalty discounts help or harm competition and consumer welfare. 
This general pattern is not new, but two conditions of relatively recent 
vintage may exercise important influence over the evolution of loyalty 
discounting norms.  The first is the increasing complexity of economic 
models deployed by academic economists and expert witnesses to describe 
the potential exclusionary effects and procompetitive benefits of various 
competitive practices, including loyalty discounts.  Admittedly, technical 
economic lingo is not new to antitrust law.  Formal economic analysis—
theoretic and empirical—has played an important role in shaping antitrust 
policy since at least the heyday of Harvard School structuralism in the 
1950s and ’60s.133  And, the Chicago School that succeeded it was 
nominally predicated almost entirely on economic analysis.134  The 
difference today is that much of the economic scholarship about antitrust 
issues is no longer expressed in readable prose presenting empirical 
observations (i.e., firms in a concentrated industry earn higher rates of 
return on capital) or theoretical ideas (i.e., a firm with market power in one 
market would not engage in tying to obtain power in a complementary 
market since raising prices in the second market would reduce demand in 
the first market).  Rather, much of the progress being made in technical 
economics relating to antitrust issues is occurring in papers that engage in 
complex economic modeling that the average lawyer or judge is unlikely to 
 
suppression of competition,” Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 
(1949), was repeatedly invoked in judicial decisions. 
131. For example, in United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003), the 
Tenth Circuit announced that, in light of post-Chicago scholarship on predatory pricing, it would 
no longer approach predatory pricing cases with “the incredulity that once prevailed.” 
132. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (holding that exclusive 
dealing contracts are only illegal if they substantially foreclose competition in the relevant 
market). 
133. Daniel Crane, Introduction to THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC SOURCES  318, 318 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2013). 
134. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY, supra 
note 133, at 390, 392 (noting that “Chicago School writers drew from Ronald Coase’s seminal 
articles on ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) and ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960),” both of 
which were built on pure economic analysis). 
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read or understand.135  Even when the intuitions behind the models are 
plainly explained, lawyers and judges often find themselves unsure of how 
much weight to put into any particular model, given the number of 
restrictive assumptions made to derive the model’s results.136  As a group of 
economists has explained as to models of loyalty discounting, “[t]he 
academic literature on loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing demonstrates 
that the welfare effects of these practices are ambiguous and that market 
details determine the direction of the effect.”137 
Given this reality, the creation of new legal catechisms is especially 
important.  Since judges will rarely have the ability, time, or disposition to 
sort through the competing models and theoretical claims on a case-by-case 
basis (much less submit them unvarnished to juries), they will increasingly 
look to the catechisms to frame their decision.  A maxim like the Second 
Circuit’s Virgin Atlantic statement that rewarding customer loyalty through 
discounts is procompetitive and beneficial might have more influence in the 
decision of a case than ten new models showing that loyalty discounts can 
exclude competitors or soften competition.  Conversely, judicial adoption 
of a maxim that loyalty discounts are often just concealed disloyalty 
penalties—a subject explored in the next Part—could have similar power in 
predisposing the decision of a case, even one in which there was not strong 
evidence that the discounts functioned to penalize disloyalty.  Hence, some 
of the highest yield in the current debates over loyalty discounts will come 
from enshrining proloyalty or antiloyalty maxims in the catechisms of law. 
The second relatively new condition—and one that is probably, for 
now, less important than the first—is the growing possibility of antitrust 
comparativism.  For most of the Sherman Act’s 120-year history, antitrust 
 
135. See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist 
Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 3–5 (2011) (reporting on empirical findings suggesting that some antitrust cases are too 
complicated for generalist judges). 
136. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 
67, 103 (2012) (noting, as to models of exclusionary effects from market share discounts in GPO 
contracts, that “the assumptions in these models are restrictive and they cannot be applied without 
significant risk of a false signal in situations that deviate from their assumptions”); Joshua D. 
Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 
ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 241 (2012) (discussing the “model selection problem” arising from the 
“endless number of theoretical models” of causes and welfare consequences of different kinds of 
competitive behaviors).  See generally Timothy J. Brennan, Competition as an Entry Barrier? 
Consumer and Total Welfare Benefits of Bundling (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory 
Studies, Related Publication No. 05-08, 2005), available at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/ 
regwpaper/339.htm (showing the large array of very different effects that can be extrapolated 
from models making different assumptions as to product bundling). 
137. Assaf Eilat et al., How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting: 
Comment, CPI ANTITRUST J. 2 (Apr. 2010), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/ 
how-loyalty-discounts-can-perversely-discourage-discounting-comment/. 
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law was largely an American peculiarity.138  The EU arose as a second 
developed antitrust system in the 1980s, but, until fairly recently, many or 
most in the U.S. antitrust community viewed EU antitrust law as either 
primitively formalistic or idiosyncratic because of the European goals of 
internal market creation.139  But now, particularly with the ascendance of 
effects-based economic reasoning, European antitrust law has the potential 
to provide a serious intellectual counterweight to U.S. antitrust law.  Of 
course, the citation of foreign law precedents in U.S. domestic law 
decisions remains controversial,140 but it may be less objectionable to 
consult foreign legal precedents that are essentially developing economic 
common law in the manner of Sherman Act jurisprudence than, say, 
deciding on the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment.  And there is the additional fact that big antitrust 
cases are increasingly played out on a global scale, with agencies and courts 
in multiple jurisdictions plying over the same controversies between the 
same parties.  Recall that the Intel case proceeded in Japan, Korea, and 
Europe before the decision at the FTC.141  In this environment, U.S. courts 
will find it increasingly difficult to ignore antitrust developments in the 
courts and agencies of the United States’ important trading partners. 
It is with these background conditions that the formation of antitrust 
policy over loyalty discounting will likely play out.  Unable or unwilling to 
process a large number of complex economic models, courts will form 
judgments based on which theories, in their simplified forms, seem most 
intuitively plausible.  These judgments probably will be internalized in the 
legal system as maxims similar in style (although not necessarily in 
orientation) to those deployed in predatory pricing law.  As judges make 
these decisions, they will increasingly be influenced by developments 
abroad, either because they will take cognizance of foreign cases or because 
the learning from those cases will infiltrate the U.S. antitrust agency 
positions, parties’ litigation positions, and scholarly literature coming 
before the courts. 
 
138. ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 6 (6th ed. 2010) (discussing the period when antitrust was an American 
peculiarity and the subsequent growth of antitrust regimes around the world). 
139. See Josef Drexl, Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance: On the 
Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 
697 (2010) (discussing how TFEU goals of enhancing economic integration may push EU law 
away from consumer welfare goals); Spencer Weber Waller & Robert Stoner, Economists 
Abroad, ANTITRUST, Spring 2001, at 66, 67 (discussing a popular view “that EU competition law 
is an arid formalistic system of rules devoid of economic analysis”). 
140. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign 
Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1335–36 (2007) (discussing the 
controversy around citation of foreign legal decisions in U.S. constitutional cases). 
141. Crane & Miralles, supra note 90, at 647. 
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II. Disloyalty Penalties and Competition Softening Theories 
This Article aims to provide a limited defense of loyalty discounts—to 
argue in favor of maxims that suggest a favorable judicial disposition 
toward such discounts.  To that end, this Part responds to the two theories 
positing that loyalty incentives can harm consumer welfare even without 
excluding rivals: first, that loyalty discounts are often just disguised 
disloyalty penalties, and second, that the deployment of loyalty provisions 
softens competition.  Because these theories challenge the essential premise 
of loyalty discounting—that these are real discounting mechanisms—they 
have the potential to turn into antiloyalty maxims with the power to 
substantially erode the use of loyalty-enhancing discounts.  However, 
neither theory is sufficiently robust or generalizable to serve as the basis for 
adoption of a new legal maxim. 
A. Loyalty Incentives as Disloyalty Penalties 
Most antitrust experts would agree that loyalty incentives can have 
long-run exclusionary effects by discouraging customers from switching 
purchases to rival suppliers, starving the rivals of needed revenues, creating 
a less competitive market, giving the loyalty-insistent seller market power, 
and hence enabling that seller to raise prices above competitive levels.142  
However, consistent with the Second Circuit’s observation in Virgin 
Atlantic that rebates to loyal customers are a form of reward,143 many courts 
and commentators have assumed that the potential long-run threat to 
competition from loyalty discounts must be balanced against the short-run 
benefit to customers from the lower price granted for their fidelity.144  This 
view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on predatory 
pricing, which characterizes the short-run pricing discount offered by a 
dominant firm as a substantial benefit to consumers that should make courts 
 
142. Even the Bush Administration’s monopolization report, which, as noted, was roundly 
criticized as too protective of dominant firms, acknowledged this potential. 
[C]ommentators and panelists generally agree that . . . such a discount may in theory 
produce anticompetitive effects, especially if customers “must carry a certain 
percentage of the leading firm’s products” and the discount is structured to induce 
purchasers to buy all or nearly all needs beyond that “uncontestable” percentage from 
the leading firm. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 95, at 107 (footnote omitted). 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 75–76. 
144. See, e.g., Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting 
that “cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition” and 
repeating the Supreme Court’s caution on acceptance of unfair pricing claims); Concord Boat 
Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1060 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting, in the context of market 
share discount analysis, the Supreme Court’s statement in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA 
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990) that “[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how 
those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten 
competition.  Hence, they cannot give rise to antitrust injury” (alteration in original)). 
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cautious about imposing antitrust liability based on the potential that such 
pricing could eventually exclude rivals and prevent monopolistic pricing at 
a later time.145  Much of the hospitability tradition toward unilaterally 
determined prices comes from a belief that “[l]ow prices benefit consumers 
regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above 
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.”146 
A growing line of criticism charges that loyalty incentives are often 
not price discounts at all but rather disguised taxes on disloyalty.147  
Although this critique has mostly appeared in academic literature, it is 
beginning to appear in judicial decisions as well.  For example, in affirming 
a plaintiff’s jury verdict based on a claim of exclusion through loyalty 
discounts, the Third Circuit recently described threatened losses of market 
share discounts as “financial penalties.”148  The court relied on this 
characterization in upholding a jury verdict finding that the defendant’s 
market share discounts were illegal even though the defendant had priced 
above cost.149  The court apparently believed that penalizing disloyalty was 
different in kind for purposes of antitrust analysis than rewarding loyalty. 
Analytically, whether something is a loyalty discount or disloyalty 
penalty depends critically on the baseline, just as the distinction between 
rewards and punishments depends on the baseline.150  The “discounts as 
penalties” assertion assumes that the baseline price—the price the customer 
would receive if she refused the loyalty discount—is an artificially inflated 
penalty price and that the loyalty discount merely brings the price back to 
 
145. See Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) 
(explaining that price discounting is generally beneficial to consumers and expressing concerns 
about chilling such price discounting through excessive predatory pricing liability). 
146. Atl. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 340. 
147. See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not 
Predatory—And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 698 
n.53 (2003) (“If loyalty rebates were never illegal unless the resulting price were below cost, then 
any firm could immunize its exclusive dealing agreements from antitrust scrutiny by the simple 
expedient of inflating the price and then offering a rebate conditioned on exclusivity.”); Jacobson, 
supra note 14, at 2 (“In some instances, moreover, the ‘discount’ might in fact be a disguised 
penalty for ‘disloyal’ buyers.”); Aaron Edlin & Joseph Farrell, Freedom to Trade and the 
Competitive Process 7–8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16818, 2011), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16818 (describing loyalty incentives in the 
multiproduct discounting context as taxes on trading with an alternative supplier); Fiona Scott-
Morton, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Contracts that Reference Rivals 9 (Apr. 5, 
2012) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/281965.pdf) (discussing 
literature showing that loyalty discounting serves as a tax on purchasing from rivals). 
148. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 277 (3d Cir. 2012). 
149. Id. at 278. 
150. See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 376 n.154 (2003) 
(observing that whether something is a punishment or a reward depends on the baseline); see also 
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 46 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“The answer to the question whether 
the government is extending a benefit or taking away a privilege rests entirely in the eye of the 
beholder.”). 
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the profit-maximizing monopoly level.  For purposes of stylizing the 
disloyalty penalty claim, assume that the price the customer would receive 
absent the loyalty incentive is x and the loyalty incentive is 1.  Under a 
discount or reward view, the customer who meets the loyalty criteria pays a 
price of x – 1, and hence improves her position as compared to the world 
with no loyalty incentive (putting aside the potential of long-run 
exclusionary effects).  Under the penalty view, however, the seller increases 
his price to x + 1 and then offers a “discount” of 1 in exchange for loyalty.  
The customer who accepts the discount achieves merely the but-for price 
absent the loyalty discount; the customer who refuses it pays a disloyalty 
penalty of 1. 
The penalty view, if widely accepted, would have severe consequences 
for antitrust policy concerning loyalty discounts.  It would alter the baseline 
view of loyalty incentives as price concessions that benefit consumers and 
should only be prohibited if they have long-run exclusionary effects.  This 
would shift loyalty incentives out of the broad safety zone for nonpredatory, 
unilaterally determined prices established in existing case law, just as the 
Third Circuit did in ZF Meritor.151 
But the view that loyalty discounts are actually disloyalty penalties 
encounters significant analytical difficulties.  In most circumstances, it is 
doubtful that a seller can successfully threaten or implement a disloyalty 
penalty without impairing its own interests far more than those of its 
customers.  Since a disloyalty penalty would usually inflict far more loss to 
the seller than to the buyer, it is not plausible that sellers routinely impose 
disloyalty penalties. 
To see why, begin with a seller in a competitive market.  Such a seller 
clearly cannot impose a disloyalty penalty on the customer who chooses to 
buy forbidden fruits from the seller’s rival.  In this example, x is a 
competitive market price.  If a seller in a competitive market raises its 
baseline price above the competitive price, customers can simply switch to 
rival sellers.  If the seller offers to reduce its price back to the competitive 
price if the customer remains loyal, that will not work either.  From the 
customer’s perspective, a requirement of loyalty is an impairment of its 
freedom to mix and match its purchases from different sellers as it prefers.  
The seller’s offer of a price of x conditioned on loyalty is less attractive 
than a competitor’s offer of a price of x not conditioned on loyalty.  The 
only way that the seller can successfully use a loyalty incentive is to 
provide a true discount from x—to go back to the standard assumption that 
a loyalty incentive results in x – 1.152 
 
151. 696 F.3d at 277–78. 
152. It is a standard assumption in the economic literature that the seller must pay the buyer to 
accept an exclusivity condition.  See Rasmusen et al., supra note 14, at 1137 (reiterating a 
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Now consider a monopoly seller.  Assuming that he has exercised his 
monopoly power, x will be the profit-maximizing monopoly price.153  Any 
disloyalty penalty he would try to set would have to be above that price, 
and hence by definition be less profitable to the monopolist than x.  The 
mere fact that the monopolist might threaten to charge an unprofitable price 
in order to coerce compliance is not itself an objection to the disloyalty 
penalty view.  The basic model of monopoly pricing posits that the 
monopolist threatens something unprofitable to itself—withholding sales 
above marginal cost—if the customer refuses to pay the monopoly price.154  
The difference here is that the monopolist who is already charging the 
profit-maximizing monopoly price is operating in the elastic portion of his 
demand curve.155  At this price, customers are willing to consider other 
products or services as substitutes for the monopolist’s product or 
service.156  Indeed, the very reason that the monopolist does not charge a 
price higher than x is that, if it did, customers would substitute to other 
suppliers. 
If the monopolist threatens a price above his profit-maximizing 
monopoly price, he is threatening to damage himself far more than he 
harms the customer.  Most or all customers who reject the monopolist’s 
insistence on loyalty will not actually incur the disloyalty penalty.  They 
will substitute to other products.157  Although they would prefer to purchase 
from the monopolist at x, the difference to them in utility between buying 
the monopolist’s product at x and substituting to other products is small.  
The harm to consumers from calling the monopolist’s bluff is slight. 
 
Chicago School claim that an excluding firm must pay buyers to accept an exclusivity 
commitment). 
153. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 82 (4th ed. 2005) 
(explaining how a monopolist sets a profit-maximizing price by equating marginal cost with 
marginal revenue). 
154. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 36–43 (rev. ed. 1971) (explaining that firms that provide a market good are 
always at risk of being undercut by the entry of another firm into the market at a lower cost); 
Mancur Olson, Collective Action, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 474, 
475–76 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (discussing how a unilateral provider of a collective good 
will refuse to provide that good above its marginal cost, and thereby limit the total output of the 
good, if others are allowed to receive that good at no cost); cf. Einer Elhauge, The Failed 
Resurrection of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 155, 178 (2010) 
(stating that a conventional product-tying tactic would result in a monopolist refusing to sell a 
product at a monopoly price if a buyer declines to buy a tied product at a supracompetitive price). 
155. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 937, 961 (1981) (explaining that “every monopolist faces an elastic demand . . . at 
its profit-maximizing output and price”). 
156. See id. 
157. This is mathematically a function of the fact that the profit-maximizing monopoly price 
is the highest price the monopolist can charge without seeing profits foregone from its customers’ 
substitute to other products. 
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By contrast, the harm to the monopolist of losing customers to 
substitution to other products is large.  The sales that the monopolist makes 
at the profit-maximizing, elastic portion of its demand curve are its most 
profitable.158  When customers substitute to other products, the monopolist 
loses not only market share, but sales at a monopoly price.  Further, by 
inducing its customers to substitute to goods or services the customers did 
not consider good substitutes at a price of x, the monopolist runs the risk of 
losing the customers entirely or forever.  Customers who experiment with 
the goods or services of a rival may decide that they prefer the rival’s 
offerings.  Even if the monopolist eventually stops threatening a disloyalty 
penalty, they may choose not to return. 
Monopolists who play a disloyalty penalty game in the elastic part of 
their demand curve will usually be taking an unwise risk.  By pricing at the 
profit-maximizing monopoly level, they have fully spent their market 
power.  The threat of a yet higher price will usually be hollow. 
Einer Elhauge, one of the leading proponents of the disloyalty penalty 
theory, has responded to this view that the monopolist lacks the power 
credibly to threaten an above x disloyalty penalty.159  Elhauge claims that 
this argument misunderstands the fundamental premise of monopoly 
pricing and that if it were true:  
[T]he seller threat under monopoly pricing would not be credible 
because, if the buyer threatened not to buy the product unless the 
monopolist lowered the price below the monopoly price to some 
above-cost level, the monopolist would find it more profitable to sell 
at that above-cost price than to forego sales and lose all profits to that 
buyer.160   
Since we know that monopoly pricing actually works, both in theory 
and in practice, Elhauge claims that there must be a fundamental error in 
the premise that threatening a price above the monopoly level will not 
work.161  Elhauge argues that the buyer who is threatened with a disloyalty 
penalty will accede to loyalty so long as her surplus from accepting the 
monopolist’s demand exceeds her surplus from rejecting it.162  Even if the 
customer is harmed less than the monopolist by the imposition of the 
threatened disloyalty penalty, collective action problems prevent her from 
calling the monopolist’s bluff.163 
 
158. See POSNER, supra note 25, at 11–12 (stating that a monopolist will always operate in 
the elastic portion of his demand curve in order to maximize profits). 
159. See Elhauge, supra note 154, at 156 (rejecting the argument that in the case of bundled 
discounts, sellers “cannot credibly threaten unbundled prices that exceed but-for prices”). 
160. Id. at 180. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 178–79. 
163. Id. at 180. 
CRANE.FINAL.RESUBMIT.OC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/18/2013  9:37 AM 
282 Texas Law Review [Vol. 92:253 
Three responses are in order.  First, the consumer’s surplus may not be 
greater if she stays loyal to the monopolist at price x and subject to a loyalty 
restraint rather than switching to a different supplier.  The imposition of an 
onerous contractual term is economically equivalent to a price increase.164  
If, as hypothesized, x without a loyalty constraint is the profit-maximizing 
monopoly price, then a price of x plus loyalty constraint, which is a cost to 
the buyer insofar as it deprives her of her freedom of choice, is an effective 
price increase.  Under standard economic assumptions, a price increase 
above the profit-maximizing monopoly price causes customers to substitute 
to new products and services because doing so increases their surplus.165  
Hence, customers will find it preferable to substitute to other goods or 
services rather than to pay the full monopoly price and become subject to a 
restrictive loyalty requirement. 
Second, even if the customer would enjoy slightly more surplus by 
purchasing at x (with the loyalty restraint) than by substituting to a rival’s 
offering, it is far from clear that collective action problems will make her 
unwilling to call the monopolist’s bluff.  The asymmetries between the 
losses to the monopolist and to the customer from customer substitution are 
large.  If the customer realizes that she has little to lose by calling the 
monopolist’s bluff and that the monopolist has much to lose, she may push 
back on the monopolist’s demand. 
Finally, it bears returning to the point made a few moments ago that a 
seller in a competitive market cannot impose a disloyalty penalty.  
Economists and antitrust scholars have long recognized that the monopolist 
who has charged a profit-maximizing monopoly price has effectively priced 
itself into a competitive market and faces competition from products that 
would not be substitutes at a lower price point.  The classic exposition of 
this point arises in the context of a fundamental error in economic 
reasoning—widely known as the “cellophane fallacy”—made by the 
Supreme Court in the DuPont case, which dealt with market definition.  In 
DuPont,166 the question was whether the relevant market should be 
considered just cellophane, in which event DuPont would have a monopoly, 
or whether there was a wider market including other flexible packaging 
materials like Pliofilm, glassine, foil, polyethylene, waxed paper, and Saran 
wrap.167  The Court concluded that the market included all flexible 
wrapping materials because there was evidence of substantial cross-
 
164. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman 
Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 870–71 (2000) (“A monopolist incurs short-term costs when it 
imposes exclusive dealing arrangements on its customers.”). 
165. Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 
76 GEO. L.J. 241, 255, 265–66 (1987). 
166. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
167. Id. at 380, 394, 400. 
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elasticity of demand168 between cellophane and the other materials.169  As 
numerous courts and commentators have pointed out since, the fact that 
consumers considered cellophane and other flexible wrapping materials 
substitutes at prevailing prices did not negate the possibility that cellophane 
was its own relevant market.170  If DuPont had monopolized the cellophane 
market and then raised the price of cellophane to the profit-maximizing 
monopoly level, other flexible wrapping materials would become good 
substitutes for cellophane at the monopoly price. 
As the DuPont case illustrates, the monopolist who has charged the 
profit-maximizing price is operating in a competitive-like environment, one 
where the monopolist faces meaningful constraints on its pricing and output 
decisions because consumers have meaningful choices at prevailing prices.  
In such a circumstance, the monopolist has no more power to threaten a 
disloyalty penalty than any other seller in an ordinary competitive market. 
Thus far, we have considered firms in competitive markets and 
monopolists charging the profit-maximizing monopoly price.  Three more 
circumstances warrant mention: sellers with some degree of market power 
in oligopoly markets, sellers of any kind engaging in price discrimination, 
and monopolists engaged in limit pricing. 
Putting aside for a moment the competition softening theories 
discussed in the next Part, the case of the oligopolist is just a weaker 
version of the case of the monopolist.  Like the monopolist, the oligopolist 
maximizes its profits by equating marginal revenue to marginal cost and is 
constrained from raising its price any further because consumers will 
substitute to rival sellers.171  Oligopolists, like monopolists, price in the 
elastic part of their demand curve where they have essentially spent all of 
their market power.  Indeed, under a conventional, kinked demand curve 
model of oligopoly pricing, the demand above the prevailing oligopoly 
price is so elastic that the oligopolist who unilaterally raises his price will 
 
168. Cross-elasticity of demand refers to the increase in demand for one product caused by an 
increase in the price of another.  F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 75 & n.55 (3d ed. 1990). 
169. DuPont, 351 U.S. at 400. 
170. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION LAW 
AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 59 n.212 (2005); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
2B ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 539 
(3d ed. 2007); POSNER, supra note 25, at 150–51; Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant 
Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1814 (1990); Lawrence J. White, 
Market Power and Market Definition in Monopolization Cases, in 2 ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 913, 919–23 (2008); Gene C. 
Schaerr, Note, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department’s Guidelines for Horizontal 
Mergers, 94 YALE L.J. 670, 676–77 (1985); see Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An 
Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 162–65 (2007) (detailing the so-called cellophane 
fallacy and attributing it to the DuPont case). 
171. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 457–58 (6th ed. 
2005) (discussing oligopoly pricing). 
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lose nearly all of her sales.172  Hence, absent collusion between oligopolists 
(discussed next), an oligopolist cannot credibly threaten a disloyalty penalty 
if it is already charging the profit-maximizing oligopoly price. 
The same is true of a firm that is engaging in price discrimination—
charging different prices to different buyers based on their different 
willingness to pay.173  As to disloyalty penalties, price discrimination is just 
a microcosm of monopoly pricing.  The seller sets its price to each buyer 
based on its perception of the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay.174  
Instead of having a unified x, we have instead a series of x’s corresponding 
to buyers’ separate reservation prices.  If the monopolist imposes a loyalty 
condition on top of x, he will lose the sale because he has exceeded the 
buyer’s reservation price.  Loyalty prices must thus be below x in order to 
stick. 
Finally, we come to the firm with market power that is engaging in 
limit pricing—a price below the short-run, profit-maximizing price 
designed to discourage new entry or substitution to rivals.175  This is the one 
circumstance where the seller might realistically threaten a disloyalty 
penalty above x.  By holding back from the profit-maximizing monopoly 
price, the seller has reserved some of its market power and can hence 
impose a penalty above x without triggering substitution to rivals and the 
loss of profitable sales.  Still, even this strategy will be risky for the limit-
pricing seller who, by definition, is concerned that approaching the 
monopoly price will facilitate the new entry or expansion of competitors. 
In sum, it is not impossible for sellers to threaten disloyalty penalties, 
just risky and unlikely in most circumstances.  As a baseline view or 
Bayesian prior belief, it is far more likely that most loyalty discounts are 
true discounts—prices below x. 
 
172. In the model, the kink occurs because each firm believes that if it raises its price above 
the current price, none of its competitors will follow suit.  Conversely, each oligopolist also 
believes that if it lowers its price, all other firms will also lower theirs.  Id. at 457.  But see 
generally George J. Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices, 55 J. POL. 
ECON. 432 (1947) (providing theoretical criticisms of the kinked-curve model). 
173. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 171, at 383–91 (defining price discrimination). 
174. Id. at 383–86. 
175. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 168, at 356–66  (discussing the strategy of precluding 
competitors’ entries into the market by using limit-pricing strategy); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 367–74 (John Bonin & Hélène Bonin trans., 1988) (explaining 
the Milgrom–Roberts model of limit pricing); VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 153, at 177–90 
(describing a dynamic analysis of limit pricing and its use in strategic competition); Joe S. Bain, A 
Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 448, 454 (1949); J.M. Clark, 
Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241, 251–53 (1940) (discussing 
limited, as compared to standardized, pricing and its potential effects on competitive practices); 
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An 
Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443, 444–45 (1982) (introducing their game-theoretic 
equilibrium formulation of limit pricing). 
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B. Competition Softening 
A second strand of the antiloyalty discount literature attacks loyalty 
inducement as a means of softening competition between oligopolists.  
Competition softening refers to the effect resulting from the adoption of 
practices by one or more oligopolists that deter their rivals from competing 
as aggressively as they otherwise would.176  Examples of practices that have 
been accused of softening competition include contracts that reference 
rivals,177 resale price maintenance,178 product differentiation,179 price-
matching clauses,180 and most-favored-nation clauses.181  Unlike theories 
that rely on the exclusion of a rival to produce anticompetitive effects, 
competition-softening theories allow for entry and competition by rivals, 
but with diminished incentives to engage in aggressive price competition. 
Commentators have postulated that loyalty discounts can have 
competition-softening effects.182  Elhauge and Wickelgren offer the fullest 
explanation.183  In their model, when a monopolist reacts to the possibility 
of new entry by offering a loyalty discount and this results in some buyers 
 
176. See Eugen Kováč, Essays on Tying in Oligopolistic Markets and on Survival in 
Financial Markets 9–10, 12–15 (June 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Charles University 
Prague), available at http://www.uni-bonn.de/~kovac/papers/dissertation_kovac.pdf (defining 
competition softening as a decrease in the level of competition that raises prices and providing a 
model of the competition-softening effect); see also PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 171, at 
441 (“Managing an oligopolistic firm is complicated . . . .  Because only a few firms are 
competing, each firm must carefully consider how its actions will affect its rivals, and how its 
rivals are likely to react.”). 
177. See Interview with Fiona Scott Morton, DAAG for Economic Analysis at the DOJ, 
ANTITRUST, Spring 2012, at 14, 17 (asserting that contracts that reference rivals can both exclude 
new entrants and soften competition). 
178. Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule 
of Reason After Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 812; see also Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, 
The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers’ Competition, 26 RAND J. ECON. 431, 432 (1995) 
(asserting that “vertical restraints, which affect intrabrand competition, can and will be used as an 
effective mechanism for reducing interbrand competition”). 
179. See TIROLE, supra note 175, at 286 (“Firms want to differentiate to soften price 
competition.”). 
180. See Stephen C. Salop, Practices That (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-Ordination, in 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265, 279–82 (Joseph E. Stiglitz 
& G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986). 
181. Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive 
Effects of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 519 (1996); see 
Thomas E. Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 17 RAND J. ECON. 
377, 377 (1986) (acknowledging that some authors have claimed that most-favored-customer 
(most-favored-nation) pricing policies may facilitate collusion); Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-
Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 528, 550–52 (1997) (recognizing, implicitly, that most-favored-nation clauses soften 
competition because it is more costly to lower prices for all customers than for individual 
customers). 
182. See Faella, supra note 14, at 381 (“The use of loyalty discounts as a tool to soften 
interbrand competition might be considered as a collusion-facilitating device . . . .”). 
183. Elhauge & Wickelgren, Anti-Competitive Exclusion, supra note 14, at 1–7. 
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who are committed to the monopolist and other buyers who are not and 
therefore are “free,” the monopolist faces a diminished incentive to match 
the new entrant’s prices for “free” buyers since that would further 
undermine the monopolist’s price to committed buyers.184  Elhauge and 
Wickelgren believe that this would occur because they understand the 
loyalty discount as a discount off of the price offered to buyers who did not 
agree to the loyalty contract—what is often referred to as the list price.185  
They apparently assume that the incumbent would have to respond to the 
new entrant’s solicitation of free buyers by lowering its list price, which 
would trigger an unprofitable reduction of its prices to its committed buyers 
as well. 
This assumption is counterfactual, or at least not generalizable.  There 
is nothing to say that a firm offering loyalty discounts to committed buyers 
has to lower its list price to attract free buyers when an entrant begins to 
compete for their business.  In most interactions between corporate buyers 
and sellers, list prices are understood to be nominal—the starting place for 
further negotiation and discounting.186  Prices are set as to individual buyers 
by a combination of terms, discounts, rebates, incentives, and side deals. 
Consider two examples.  First, consider a typical pricing structure for a 
medical device—in this case a catheter.187  A hospital that wants to buy 
catheters will usually belong to at least one GPO, but often it will decide to 
join several GPOs in order to be able to select the best starting prices it can 
on a product-by-product basis.188  Access to a GPO contract generally 
involves no commitment by the buyer to purchase anything from the 
seller.189  Often, a GPO contract will list a number of sellers of the same 
product from whom the hospital can choose to buy.190  Prices under the 
GPO contract are ascertained by tiers that combine volume and market 
share requirements—for example, a requirement that the hospital buy at 
least $100,000 and 85% of its requirements within the product category 
from the vendor.191  Sometimes, the more advantageous tiers require that 
 
184. Id. at 1 (“The seller commitment to maintain a loyalty discount reduces the seller’s 
incentive to compete for buyers free of a loyalty agreement because lowering the price to free 
buyers requires lowering the price to loyal buyers who have already agreed to buy from the 
seller.”). 
185. Id. at 8 n.10 (“[A]greeing to a loyalty discount simply means that the buyer receives a 
discount from the price (often called a ‘list price’) offered to buyers who did not agree to a loyalty 
contract.”). 
186. See, e.g., St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1079 (E.D. Mo. 
2009) (describing GPOs as “helpful in establishing the market price for a particular product and in 
establishing a starting point for negotiations for lower-priced commodity products”). 
187. See id. at 1076.  The following facts are largely taken from St. Francis Medical Center. 
188. See id. at 1079. 
189. Id. at 1081. 
190. See id. at 1079. 
191. See id. at 1080–81 (detailing the various types of GPO discounting tiers). 
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the hospital purchase from the seller across multiple product lines, thus 
injecting an element of bundling into the equation.192  Although a member 
hospital of the GPO is entitled to purchase under the GPO contract, nothing 
requires the hospital to do so.  Hospitals may, and often do, elect to 
negotiate directly with suppliers.193  Even hospitals that buy under GPO 
contracts sometimes negotiate side deals for extra discounts or rebates on 
top of the GPO contracts.194  GPO contracts do not force hospitals to 
purchase in any particular way, nor do they guarantee that the manufacturer 
will not offer other customers lower prices outside of the GPO contract.195 
Or, consider the way that Intel set its computer chip prices to OEMs, 
as described in the European Commission’s prohibition decision.  Like the 
medical device manufacturers, Intel started with a “Customer Authorized 
Price,” essentially a list price, which then became a target for OEMs to 
dicker for price reductions.196  Intel then offered a series of discounting, 
rebating, or funding possibilities based on a variety of criteria such as the 
introduction of new technologies or an OEM’s efforts to promote Intel 
products.197  These were just Intel’s formal pricing programs.  When it 
came to real pricing, Intel negotiated individually with OEMs and retailers 
over tailored pricing concessions.  For example, Dell received discounts or 
rebates pursuant to a program formally structured by Intel for Dell, various 
short-term price concession agreements, and one-off deals.198 
As these examples illustrate, corporation-to-corporation price setting is 
rarely as simple as setting a list price and a schedule of discounts for loyal 
customers.  Sellers and buyers—both committed and free—constantly 
bargain over price and loyalty, adjusting their bargains as market and 
competitive conditions change.  Effective prices are often hidden under 
layers upon layers of contracts, schedules, side letters, and one-off pricing 
deals. 
Given these conditions, it is difficult to see how loyalty discounting 
softens competition or contributes to oligopolistic pricing coordination.  
When new firms or technologies enter the market, all buyers—whether 
committed or uncommitted—will scramble to deploy their added leverage 
to exact additional concessions from the monopolist seller.  The monopolist 
need not respond by offering a uniform set of prices and pricing 
concessions for loyal and disloyal customers.  Rather, it will continue to do 
what it did before there was new entry—try to exact the maximum price it 
 
192. Id. at 1081. 
193. Id. at 1081–82. 
194. Id. 
195. See id. 
196. NON-CONFIDENTIAL COMMISSION DECISION, supra note 12, ¶ 175. 
197. Id. ¶¶ 177–178. 
198. Id. ¶¶ 187–216. 
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can from each customer given market realities and try to disguise its most 
favorable prices to its customers with the greatest buying power so that 
other customers will not clamor for similar discounts. 
Further idiosyncrasies with Elhauge and Wickelgren’s model render it 
inapplicable to the large majority of recently contested loyalty discount 
cases.  They assume a market with an incumbent monopolist and only one 
potential rival,199 a scenario that matches virtually none of the recently 
contested loyalty discount cases.200  They assume that a loyalty contract 
entails a commitment by the buyer to purchase 100% of its requirements 
from the seller.201  But in most contemporary loyalty discount situations, the 
buyer can achieve the seller’s best price by buying some lesser amount than 
its full requirements from the seller.202  For example, in Concord Boat,203 
customers obtained the maximum market share discount for the 1995–1997 
model years by buying 70% of their boat engine requirements from the 
defendant, Brunswick.204  Intel generally required computer manufacturers 
to make 80%–95% of their purchases from Intel to secure a loyalty 
rebate.205  In the GPO cases, customers generally maximize their loyalty 
discount with a purchase of 80%–85% of their requirements from the seller 
and can still obtain loyalty discounts at rates as low as 50%.206  R.J. 
Reynolds required an 85% market share for its best price.207  The fact that 
loyalty discounts are often awarded for less than full loyalty is significant 
because smaller rivals or new entrants have an opportunity to obtain 
significant sales from customers without increasing the price the customer 
pays for its purchases from the dominant seller.208  Finally, although 
 
199. Elhauge & Wickelgren, Anti-Competitive Exclusion, supra note 14, at 42. 
200. See supra notes 187–98 and accompanying text. 
201. See Elhauge & Wickelgren, Anti-Competitive Exclusion, supra note 14, at 8 (assuming 
that “buyers commit to buy only from the incumbent in exchange for receiving a discount . . . off 
the price that [the incumbent] offers to buyers who do not sign the contract” (emphasis added)). 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 26–27, 47. 
203. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000). 
204. Id. at 1044.  Of note, when Brunswick attempted to increase the loyalty level to 95% in 
1994, its effort was beaten back “due to serious backlash from boat builders.”  Id. at 1044–45. 
205. See Paul Jones, American Antitrust Jurisprudence Applied to European Commission v. 
Intel, BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV., Winter 2010, at 52, 55–57 (summarizing Intel’s market share 
discount provisions to OEMs). 
206. See Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 2011) (reporting that 
hospitals achieved the maximum market share rebate at 85% of their catheter requirements and 
received loyalty rebates for purchasing as little as, or less than, 50% of their requirements from 
C.R. Bard). 
207. See Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 877–78 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
208. Greg Shaffer and Zhijun Chen have argued that partial exclusive dealing can threaten 
competition even more than pure exclusive dealing since the monopolist must pay customers to 
enter into exclusive dealing relationships and can do so more cheaply by purchasing only partial 
loyalty.  Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, Naked Exclusion with Minimum-Share Requirements, 
Presentation at the University of East Anglia (June 2010) (slides from the presentation are 
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Elhauge and Wickelgren consider models where the customer contractually 
commits to purchase under the loyalty discount program and ones where 
the customer can obtain the loyalty discount without making any ex ante 
commitment, they obtain much stronger results when the buyer is required 
to make an ex ante commitment.209  As already noted, a buyer commitment 
to future loyalty was not at issue in most of the contemporary loyalty 
discount cases. 
There is another peculiarity about thinking of loyalty discounts as 
competition softening devices.  Competition softening theories generally 
assume that the function of a competition softening device is to facilitate 
supracompetitive pricing by oligopolists.210  Oligopolists generally benefit 
from competition softening devices at the expense of consumers.  If a 
loyalty discount operated to make the incumbent monopolist less willing to 
match a new entrant’s prices to “free” customers, then this should benefit 
the new entrant.  In that case, we should not expect to see many cases in 
which smaller rivals complain about their dominant competitor’s use of 
loyalty discounts.  But that is exactly what we observe in virtually all of the 
recently contested loyalty discount cases.211  The fact that competitors are 
the chief complainants about loyalty discounts does not mean that these 
devices are not anticompetitive—they could still be exclusionary.  But it 
does mean that they are unlikely to be competition softening devices, as 
that concept is usually understood. 
In sum, it is possible to create models in which the use of loyalty 
clauses softens competition.  It is unlikely, however, that these models are 
useful in describing the key questions that antitrust law needs to address 
today. 
Even if the disloyalty penalty and competition softening claims are not 
generalizable, this does not mean that loyalty incentives are always 
procompetitive.  Rather, it means that loyalty discounts should continue to 
be evaluated for exclusionary effects—generally, the foreclosure of rivals’ 
ability to compete in the market.212 
 
available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107590/greg_shaffer_new_slides 
.pdf).  While their model is intriguing as an explanation for how monopolists might afford a 
campaign to exclude rivals, it does not respond to the observation that partial exclusivity 
commitments foreclose less of the market than pure exclusive dealing and therefore may leave 
rivals room to enter or expand in the market.  See Crane & Miralles, supra note 90, at 638–46 
(discussing the economic meaning of exclusive dealing law’s substantial foreclosure requirement). 
209. Elhauge & Wickelgren, Anti-Competitive Exclusion, supra note 14, at 27–41. 
210. See, e.g., Salop, supra note 180 (discussing the use of meeting competition clauses as 
facilitating practices that soften competition in concentrated markets). 
211. See supra subpart I(B). 
212. On the meaning of the foreclosure requirement, see Crane & Miralles, supra note 90, at 
633–46. 
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III. Loyalty and the Customer Perspective 
The previous Part responded to two criticisms of loyalty discounting 
and hence played a defensive role with respect to loyalty incentives.  This 
final Part presents an affirmative case for loyalty discounting from the 
buyer’s perspective.  It does not attempt an exhaustive catalog of the ways 
that loyalty discounts benefit buyers, some of which were already discussed 
in the context of distinguishing loyalty and volume-based discounts in 
subpart I(A).  Rather, it shows that the conduct of buyers in not only 
accepting, but in some cases soliciting, loyalty discounts is an important 
piece of empirical evidence in considering their effects on buyers.  To that 
end, this Part first discusses why buyer initiation should be relevant to the 
antitrust inquiry and responds to critics who claim that it should not.  It then 
provides examples of loyalty discounts that have been solicited or approved 
by dominant buyers who are unlikely to be the victims of the sorts of 
collective action problems that could lead buyers to grudgingly accept 
contractual provisions that are not in their collective interests.  Finally, it 
considers the relevance of a strand of management literature discussing the 
benefits to buyers of entering into loyalty relationships with suppliers. 
A. The Relevance of Buyer Demand for Loyalty Discounts 
Antitrust suspicion of loyalty incentives is motivated by the fear that 
such incentives could harm the interests of buyers by enabling sellers to 
obtain market power and to charge higher prices.  Hence, evidence that 
buyers affirmatively seek or approve of loyalty discounts could provide 
some counterevidence to this suspicion.213  And, indeed, buyers are often 
the instigators in seeking loyalty discounts or other contractual terms that 
restrict their ability or incentives to purchase from alternative suppliers.214 
Nonetheless, the mere fact that buyers are sometimes complicit in 
loyalty discount schemes is not, in itself, conclusive evidence in support of 
loyalty discounts’ procompetitive potential.  Einer Elhauge, one of loyalty 
 
213. See Richard M. Steuer, Customer-Instigated Exclusive Dealing, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 239, 
251 (2000) (arguing that buyer-initiated exclusive dealings should sometimes be treated more 
favorably than seller-initiated ones on the theory that buyer initiation provides some evidence that 
the contract is not against the buyer’s interests). 
214. See, e.g., NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 454 (6th Cir. 2007).  The court 
observed: 
According to NicSand’s own complaint, all but one of the large retailers made 
exclusivity a condition for doing business with a new supplier. . . .  If retailers have 
made supplier exclusivity a barrier to entry, one cannot bring an antitrust claim 
against a supplier for acquiescing to that requirement. 
Id.  See also White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951, 960, 1032 (W.D. 
Mich. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that an agreement in 
which twenty-nine hospitals formed a purchasing group and agreed to purchase from a single 
medical-products supplier offering nationwide distribution was not an exclusive dealing 
arrangement). 
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discounts’ leading critics, has argued that buyer initiation of loyalty 
discounts is irrelevant.215  Elhauge observes that buyers who enter into 
anticompetitive loyalty contracts impose externalities on other buyers and 
that buyers face collective action problems in minimizing these 
externalities.216  Elhauge argues that these effects are exacerbated if the 
buyer is an intermediary purchaser that can pass along most of any 
anticompetitive overcharge to its own downstream buyers.217  Fleshing out 
this intuition, Elhauge and Wickelgren propose a model under which there 
exists no equilibrium in which all buyers reject the seller’s offer of a loyalty 
inducement; hence the seller’s offer becomes coercive.218  Buyers have no 
choice but to accept because they will feel the exclusionary effect whether 
or not they do and are better off at least taking the crumbs offered under the 
guise of a loyalty discount. 
Once again, it is questionable whether the assumptions underlying this 
model are sufficiently general to make the model analytically useful in 
deriving antitrust rules for the sorts of loyalty discounts at issue in 
contemporary antitrust litigation.  Elhauge and Wickelgren assume that in 
order to secure loyalty commitments, the buyer must contractually commit 
to purchase only from the seller.219  That assumption does not generally 
hold for two reasons.  First, most of the loyalty discounts at issue in recent 
cases did not involve any contractual commitment of loyalty by the buyer.  
Usually, the buyer remained contractually free to purchase goods from 
whomever it chose, but received a better price for exhibiting loyalty to the 
seller.220  Second, Elhauge and Wickelgren assume that, in order to secure 
the loyalty discount, the buyer must agree not to purchase goods from any 
of the seller’s rivals—that is to say, they assume pure exclusive dealing.221  
As noted earlier, however, most of the loyalty discounts challenged in 
recent cases have required only partial loyalty commitments—often in the 
80%–90% range.222 
There is a more general point about the collective action explanation 
for buyers’ acceptance of loyalty discounts.  Collective action problems 
would explain why buyers who cannot coordinate with other buyers and are 
price takers would succumb to loyalty discounts.  It would not explain why 
 
215. Elhauge, supra note 154, at 183. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
219. Id. at 4. 
220. See St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc. 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1081–82 (E.D. Mo. 
2009); supra notes 19–21, 192–95 and accompanying text. 
221. Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion, supra note 14, at 4 (“[W]e do not consider 
discounts based on partial loyalty.  We assume loyalty discount contracts require the buyer to not 
purchase any goods from the rival.”). 
222. See supra notes 202–08 and accompanying text. 
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dominant buyers who can and do coordinate with other buyers or who have 
the power independently to shape the seller’s pricing conduct would accept 
loyalty discounts.  Thus, evidence that dominant buyers or buyers who 
coordinate with other buyers actively solicit loyalty discounts undermines 
any claim that loyalty discounts are generally explicable because of cost 
externalization and buyer collective action problems. 
As with any of the claims discussed in this Article, evidence of loyalty 
discount solicitation or approval by dominant or coordinating buyers does 
not eliminate the possibility that loyalty discounts are anticompetitive.  
They could still be anticompetitive in circumstances where buyers are price 
takers or cannot coordinate.  But evidence that powerful buyers 
affirmatively seek loyalty discounts does suggest that loyalty discounts may 
provide important benefits to all buyers.  As courts decide whether to treat 
loyalty discounts with hospitability or inhospitability, evidence of buyer 
solicitation may be significant.  With that background, we turn to two 
examples of dominant or coordinating buyers who actively use loyalty 
incentives to reduce their acquisition costs. 
B. Examples of Loyalty Discounts Sought by Dominant Buyers 
1. The Federal Government.—The federal government is the world’s 
largest purchaser.223  In recent years, federal government procurement 
administrators have emphasized the importance of leveraging the federal 
government’s massive spending power to reduce acquisition costs and save 
taxpayers money.  For example, in a statement to the Senate Budget 
Committee, the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy in the Office 
of Management and Budget listed the procurement initiatives federal 
agencies had recently implemented in order to more efficiently use taxpayer 
resources.224  Included in these was a strategic sourcing initiative, in which 
agencies leverage their collective buying power in order to secure better 
discounts from contractors.  In order to do this, agencies necessarily have to 
give up some amount of individual choice in suppliers and start using 
certain types of products agency-wide or government-wide (such as office 
supplies).  The Administrator gave one example of the Department of 
Homeland Security switching over to a standardized, department-wide 
 
223. Peter Orszag, Buying in Bulk, WHITE HOUSE OMBLOG (June 30, 2010, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/06/30/Buying-in-Bulk. 
224. Responsible Contracting: Modernizing the Business of Government: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Budget, 111th Cong. 88 (2010) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Hon. Daniel 
I. Gordon, Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy); see also Memorandum from Paul A. 
Denett, Adm’r for Fed. Procurement Pol’y, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Chief Acquisition 
Officers 1 (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/pro 
curement/strat_sourc/2007_report_guidance.pdf (discussing initiatives for “implementing 
strategic sourcing across agencies”). 
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operating system and then negotiating one contract for the full suite of 
desktop services at a substantial savings.225 
Federal procurement administrators have stressed the desirability of 
using the government’s massive spending power to negotiate substantial 
discount terms.  Among the cost-lowering tools urged by procurement 
officers are blanket purchase agreements (BPAs), which secure supplier 
commitments to supply federal buyers at reduced costs.226  Although federal 
administrators stress the importance of supplier competition at the contract 
negotiation stage,227 they also acknowledge the discount benefits of 
strategic sole-source contracting.228  Federal law permits sole-source 
contracting under some circumstances,229 and federal administrators have 
defended it as a means of securing superior contractual terms.230 
Although the federal government often simply leverages its buying 
volume to secure superior prices, it also engages in the loyalty-bargaining 
strategy of trading government market share for superior pricing.  Airline 
 
225. Hearings, supra note 224, at 90 (“[T]he Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
expects to save more than $87 million during the next six years by having standardized 
department-wide desktop operating systems, e-mail, and office automation and then negotiating a 
department-wide [blanket purchasing agreement] for the full suite of products at a substantial 
savings.”). 
226. Memorandum from Daniel I. Gordon, Adm’r for Fed. Procurement Pol’y, Office of 
Mgmt. & Budget, to Chief Acquisition Officers & Senior Procurement Execs. 1–2 (Dec. 22, 2009) 
[hereinafter Gordon Memorandum], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/assets/procurement_memo/Achieving_Better_Value_from_Acquisitions.pdf. 
227. See id. attachment at 1 (“The GAO found that agencies did not take advantage of 
opportunities for competition in establishing BPAs—a sure way to get better deals—and often 
considered only one vendor.  Frequent use of single award BPAs resulted in a lack of competition 
on resulting orders.”); see also Gov’t Servs. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Sheet 
Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI) Office Supply Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs), 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.dm.usda.gov/procurement/toolkit/FSSIOfficeSupplyBPAsFAQs 
.pdf (discussing “competition requirements” in the context of blanket purchase agreements). 
228. See Gordon Memorandum, supra note 226, attachment at 1–2.  Gordon directed that 
federal procurement officials should: 
Seek discounts when establishing schedule BPAs and, as appropriate, when placing 
orders, especially large dollar orders. . . .  If, upon review, the agency determines that 
renegotiation of a BPA could lead to discounts—or deeper discounts—for agency 
buyers, explore, in consultation with agency counsel, what options are immediately 
available. 
Id. 
229. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3304(a) (Supp. V 2012).  Sole-source contracting bears greater 
risks to competition than contractual terms rewarding loyalty since under sole-source contracting 
there is neither competition for the contract nor competition under the contract. 
230. See Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations: Hearing Before the Ad 
Hoc Subcomm. on Contracting Oversight of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental 
Affairs, 111th Cong. 24 (2009) (statement of Joseph Jordan, Associate Administrator, Government 
Contracting and Business Development, U.S. Small Business Administration).  Jordan stated: 
[I]n every contract . . . the contracting officer must certify that the government got 
fair and reasonable value . . . .  So to say that the government did not get the best 
value because it was sole sourced is, or should be, inaccurate. 
Id. 
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travel is a case in point.  The Government Services Agency (GSA) 
negotiates price schedules with airlines for various routes that are 
contingent upon the federal government’s delivery of a minimum market 
share of federal travel.  As the GSA explains: 
GSA concentrates on the government’s market share to make the 
most of the competition available.  The government traveler’s 
responsibility is to use the contract carrier.  The government’s 
delivery of market share drives the program.  So, to ensure the fares 
stay favorable, we encourage federal travelers to use the contract 
carrier.231 
It is hard to imagine that the federal government, whose employees 
probably fly hundreds of millions of miles a year, is a victim of a collective 
action problem that forces the GSA to offer market share commitments in 
exchange for not being penalized by disloyalty discounts.  A far more 
plausible explanation is that the federal government is a big, powerful, and 
sophisticated buyer that has figured out how to offer market share (i.e., 
loyalty)—and not just volume—as a bargaining chip to decrease its input 
acquisition costs. 
2. Buying Organizations.—Another piece of evidence pointing against 
the claim that buyer initiation or approval of loyalty discounts does not 
count since buyers face intractable collective action problems is the 
pervasive deployment of loyalty discounts by buyers’ organizations that 
come into being precisely in order to coordinate buyer decisions and hence 
solve collective action problems.  These are matters of degree since 
coordinated action by just a few buyers in a market with many buyers 
would not overcome buyer-wide collective action problems.  However, 
when buyers create buying organizations representing large percentages of 
the buyers in a market expressly for the purpose of leveraging buyer power 
and driving down prices and those organizations then bargain for loyalty 
discounts, the cost externalization–collective action story becomes much 
less persuasive. 
Buyers’ organizations in various health care fields provide strong 
examples of power buyers deploying their bargaining power to exact 
loyalty discounts.232  Take, for instance, pharmacy benefit managers 
 
231. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/con 
tent/103835 (last reviewed Sept. 6, 2013). 
232. A number of the recent loyalty discount cases have occurred in the medical devices 
industry, where large GPOs, representing large aggregations of hospitals, pervasively bargain for 
market share and other loyalty discounts.  See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco 
Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2010).  GPOs are designed in large part to solve 
collective action problems and leverage buyer power.  See John B. Kirkwood & Richard O. 
Zerbe, Jr., The Path to Profitability: Reinvigorating the Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 39, 94 (2009) (noting that two separate GPOs formed by retail pharmacies 
were alone able to sponsor the entry of additional wholesalers into their regions).  Hence this 
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(PBMs), which have recently come under scrutiny for their contracting 
practices.233  PBMs manage the pharmacy benefits of group health plan 
sponsors such as HMOs, self-insured employees, indemnity plans, labor-
union plans, and public-employee plans.234  As one report has indicated, 
“[n]inety-five percent of patients with prescription drug . . . coverage 
receive their benefits through a PBM.”235  PBMs play several roles on 
behalf of plans.  They determine what drugs should be on the plan 
formulary and negotiate with retailers for reimbursement rates when drugs 
on the formulary are dispensed at retail.236  PBMs also negotiate with drug 
manufacturers for discounts or rebates on brand name or generic drugs.237 
Market share discounts are a large part of the PBMs’ strategy to drive 
down prices from drug manufacturers.  Both the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) and FTC noted that manufacturer rebates were driven in large part 
by the PBMs’ ability to increase the manufacturer’s market share.238  The 
 
might provide a counterstory to the claim that buyer collective action problems undermine the 
evidence that buyers solicit loyalty discounts.  However, hospital GPOs have come under 
criticism for failing to serve the interests of their member hospitals.  See S. PRAKASH SETHI, 
GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS: AN UNDISCLOSED SCANDAL IN THE U.S. HEALTHCARE 
INDUSTRY 46–51 (2009) (enumerating instances of “questionable contracting practices” by GPOs, 
which allegedly harmed member hospitals); see also Einer Elhauge, The Exclusion of 
Competition for Hospital Sales Through Group Purchasing Organizations 17–23 (June 25, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo_ 
report_june_02.pdf (discussing several reasons why GPO practices “cause[] and threaten[] serious 
anticompetitive effects”).  But see generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, HEALTH INDUS. GRP. 
PURCHASING ASS’N, GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATION (GPO) PURCHASING AGREEMENTS 
AND ANTITRUST LAW (2004), www.supplychainassociation.org/resource/resmgr/press_releases_ 
2004/2004hovenkampgposandantitrus.pdf (arguing that GPO arrangements can lower prices and 
provide procompetitive benefits); FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING 
HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/ 
040723healthcarerpt.pdf (considering both procompetitive and potentially anticompetitive aspects 
of GPO agreements, along with other practices in the medical sector). 
233. Elhauge has extended his criticisms of GPOs to PBMs, arguing that “[t]he largest PBM 
has a smaller market share than the largest GPO and thus would externalize even more of the 
market harm that would be caused if it agreed to an anticompetitive loyalty agreement.”  Elhauge, 
supra note 154, at 184.  Elhauge’s comments have been overtaken by subsequent events.  
Following the Express Scripts–MedCo merger, the combined company had a market share over 
40% and was effectively in a duopoly situation with CVS Caremark.  Daniel Weiss, FTC 
Approves Express Scripts-Medco Merger, PHARMACY TIMES (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/FTC-Approves-Express-Scripts-Medco-Merger. 
234. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-196, REPORT TO THE HON. BYRON L. 
DORGAN, U.S. SENATE, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ HEALTH BENEFITS: EFFECTS OF USING 
PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS ON HEALTH PLANS, ENROLLEES, AND PHARMACIES 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/236828.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 232, ch. 7, at 10–16. 
235. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 232, ch. 7, at 11. 
236. Id. at 12–14. 
237. Id. at 13–14. 
238. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 234, at 11 (“Drug manufacturers provide 
PBMs certain rebates depending not only on inclusion of their drugs on a plan’s formulary but 
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Food and Drug Administration has noted that PBM rebates from 
manufacturers are predicated on the PBM “moving market share” to the 
manufacturer.239  Because a few large PBMs are effectively bargaining 
agents on behalf of tens of millions of patients, they exercise substantial 
leverage in these negotiations. 
Both the GAO and FTC have studied the effect of PBMs on drug 
prices and found them to lower prices.  For example, the GAO found that 
prices federal employees paid under PBM contracts were roughly 18% 
below the price paid by patients without third-party coverage.240  The GAO 
attributed this in part to the manufacturer rebates.241  In a subsequent report 
to Congress, the FTC found that private-sector employers that offer 
prescription drug coverage pay less when using a mail-order pharmacy 
owned by a PBM than when using a mail-order or retail pharmacy that the 
PBM does not own.242 
Although PBMs have been criticized for not fully passing on their 
rebates and cost savings to plans or insureds, there is little question that 
PBMs have effectively reduced retail drug prices.  If anything, the primary 
criticism of PBMs is that they leverage too much buyer power on behalf of 
insurance companies, squeezing discounts, rebates, and other incentives out 
of retailers.243  As is well recognized in economic theory, cooperative 
buying arrangements can create monopsony power and thereby allow the 
purchasers to suppress prices below the competitive level.244  Tellingly, the 
 
also on the PBMs’ ability to increase a manufacturer’s market share for certain drugs.”); FED. 
TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 232, ch. 7, at 14.  That report indicated: 
[T]he contract negotiated with the pharmaceutical manufacturer may provide a rebate 
off the fees owed by the PBM based on (a) a percentage of AWP or some other 
wholesale benchmark, (b) achieving certain specified sales or market share targets, 
(c) preferred placement of certain drug products on the PBMs’ formulary, or (d) a 
combination of items (a)–(c). 
Id. 
239. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETING ACT: DRAFT REPORT TO 
CONGRESS attachment G, at 2-3 (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatory 
Information/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstothe
FDCAct/PrescriptionDrugMarketingActof1987/UCM203186.pdf; see also Lawrence W. Abrams, 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers as Bargaining Agents 10–13 (unpublished manuscript) (July 6, 
2005), available at http://www.nu-retail.com/pbm_bargaining_paper.pdf (discussing PBMs’ use 
of market share discounts). 
240. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 234, at 4. 
241. Id. at 9. 
242. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER 
PHARMACIES vi–vii (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefit 
rpt.pdf. 
243. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 234, at 24 (“[P]harmacy association 
representatives report that PBMs’ large market shares leave many retail pharmacies with little 
leverage in negotiating with PBMs.  These officials indicate . . . actual negotiations only occur[] 
in [limited] instances . . . .”). 
244. ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 106–
22 (2010). 
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National Association of Chain Drug Stores opposed the merger of two large 
PBMs, Express Scripts and Medco, apparently fearing that a powerful 
mega-PBM could squeeze prices even further.245  Monopsonization or 
oligopsonization by GPOs may be an independent reason to fear loyalty 
discounts, but it is the opposite of the one at issue in virtually all of the 
contemporary loyalty discounting cases.  What the PBM story quite clearly 
shows is that coordinating buyers can use loyalty discounts to drive down 
prices. 
Evidence of loyalty discounts sought by coordinating buyers does not 
mean that buyers never face collective action problems that dominant 
sellers exploit through offering loyalty discounts.  But the fact that buyers 
can and do coordinate over large segments of the market erodes the claim 
that buyers would only accept loyalty discounts because of collective action 
problems.  Some buyers may find themselves in the position of accepting 
loyalty discounts that they know injure buyers collectively, but that is far 
less characteristic of loyal buyers as a whole. 
C. The Value of Buyer–Seller Loyalty 
Having established that buyers at least sometimes seek loyalty 
discounts in order to drive down their prices, we come finally to the 
question of how loyalty discounts fit into broader issues of loyalty between 
seller and buyer.  For this, we turn to the management literature on loyalty 
in buyer–seller relations. 
A conventional model of business procurement holds that buyers 
should deliberately not exhibit loyalty—that they should seek to generate 
competition between rival sellers in order to obtain the lowest possible 
prices and the best terms of purchase.  Michael Porter, for example, argues 
that total procurement costs will be minimized by introducing and 
maintaining competition among suppliers, which can only be realized if the 
buyer procures from multiple sources.246  In Porter’s view, the threat of 
losing business to another supplier who already has an established 
 
245. The Proposed Merger Between Express Scripts and Medco: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 82–83 (2011) (statement of Dennis Wiesner, Senior Director of Privacy, Pharmacy, 
and Governmental Affairs, H-E-B Grocery Company); New NACDS Ad Reflects Skepticism, 
Opposition Surrounding Proposed Express Scripts and Medco Merger, NACDS.ORG (Oct. 4, 
2011), http://www.nacds.org/Home/TabId/107/PostId/144/new-nacds-ad-reflects-skepticism-
opposition-surrounding-proposed-express-scripts-and-medco-merger.aspx. 
246. See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND 
SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1985); Richard G. Newman, Single Sourcing: Short-Term 
Savings Versus Long-Term Problems, J. PURCHASING & MATERIALS MGMT., Summer 1989, at 
20, 23–24 (discussing the short-term benefits of sole-source contracting but observing that in the 
long run there can be negative effects, such as source dependency). 
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relationship with the buyer incentivizes suppliers to deliver product quality 
at low cost.247 
By contrast, a wide business-management literature stresses the 
benefits to buyers of entering into long-term monogamous or 
semimonogamous relationships with suppliers—of pursuing loyal 
relationships.248  Among the frequently cited benefits of buyer–seller 
loyalty is trust building.249  A long-term loyal relationship decreases the 
likelihood of seller opportunism.250  The procurement literature also stresses 
a number of other benefits to buyers of concentrating purchases on a small 
number of sellers.  Among these are minimizing search and transaction 
costs,251 driving down acquisition costs through the leverage of buying 
power,252 avoiding supply-chain disruptions,253 achieving economies of 
 
247. See PORTER, supra note 246, at 135–37 (“Anything a firm can do that lowers the buyer’s 
total cost of using a product or other buyer costs represents a potential basis for differentiation.”). 
248. See, e.g., W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS 23 (1986); Michael J. Dorsch et al., 
The Role of Relationship Quality in the Stratification of Vendors as Perceived by Customers, 26 J. 
ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 128, 128–29 (1998); F. Robert Dwyer et al., Developing Buyer-Seller 
Relationships, J. MARKETING, Apr. 1987, at 11, 12 (concluding that “both business marketing and 
consumer marketing benefit from attention to conditions that foster relational bonds leading to 
reliable repeat business”); C. Jay Lambe et al., Social Exchange Theory and Research on 
Business-to-Business Relational Exchange, 8 J. BUS.-TO-BUS. MARKETING, no. 3, 2001, at 1, 4–
12 (outlining social exchange theory, which holds that parties enter into and maintain relationships 
with the expectation that doing so will be rewarding); Michiel R. Leenders et al., Adapting 
Purchasing to Supply Chain Management, 24 INT’L J. PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS 
MGMT. 40, 41 (1994) (suggesting that companies change their organizational design to take better 
advantage of the benefits associated with strategic alliances with suppliers); Achim Walter et al., 
The Impact of Satisfaction, Trust, and Relationship Value on Commitment: Theoretical 
Considerations and Empirical Results (Sept. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.impgroup.org/uploads/papers/131.pdf (stressing the value of customer commitment to 
a successful long-term business relationship). 
249. See Lambe et al., supra note 248, at 10–11, 21–23 (explaining how “[t]rust . . . enables 
firms to become committed and look past short-term opportunities for the long-term benefits 
available from the relationship” and stating that “[e]xchange participants begin to expect that their 
partners will participate in cooperative behaviors that benefit the firms.  As these cooperative 
behaviors become common, expected, and acceptable either implicitly or explicitly, cooperation 
becomes a norm” (citation omitted)). 
250. Timothy G. Hawkins et al., Public Versus Private Sector Procurement Ethics and 
Strategy: What Each Sector Can Learn from the Other, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 567, 571 (2011) 
(noting that for-profit firms “frequently rely upon the expected long-term duration of the 
relationship between a buyer and supplier to decrease opportunism”). 
251. Wedad J. Elmaghraby, Supply Contract Competition and Sourcing Policies, 2 
MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MGMT. 350, 352 (2000) (“By pouring time and 
energy into establishing one strong and lasting relationship, a buyer is able to cut down on costs 
by avoiding downtime, rework, and excessive administration and increase quality by establishing 
a relationship that is responsive to the buyer’s needs and demands.”). 
252. See id. at 362 (finding that by introducing another seller, “the threat of losing business to 
a second source may allow the buyer to secure a lower price”). 
253. See Andreas Eggert et al., Benchmarking the Impact of Customer Share in Key-Supplier 
Relationships, 24 J. BUS. & INDUS. MARKETING 154, 154 (2009) (“The advantages of working 
with fewer suppliers are well documented in the purchasing and supply chain management 
literature.  From a cost perspective, placing a greater emphasis on fewer suppliers allows a 
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scope or scale,254 and contributing to product-quality improvement by 
securing the seller’s attention to the buyer’s needs.255 
All of this sounds good for buyer loyalty, but raises a question about 
loyalty discounts: If loyalty is so valuable to buyers, then why do sellers 
have to pay them to stay loyal?  If buyers gain so much by staying loyal to a 
single seller, then why wouldn’t we observe buyers seeking exclusive or 
semi-exclusive relationships with suppliers without the need for any 
inducement by the seller? 
There is an easy answer and a harder one.  The easy answer is that one 
of the benefits to buyers identified in the procurement literature is price 
reductions.256  In other words, part of the gains to buyers from loyal 
relationships comes from the fact that their loyalty allows them to obtain 
lower prices from sellers. 
The harder answer has to do with the fact that loyal buyer–seller 
relationships can simultaneously benefit both buyers and sellers.257  Some 
of their gains from loyalty—such as transaction cost reduction, achieving 
scale economies, or enhancing business planning—may be joint.  In that 
case, the seller’s and buyer’s relative bargaining positions determine how 
they allocate their mutual gains between themselves.  Other aspects of a 
customer’s loyalty may benefit one party at the expense of the other, or may 
provide the parties asymmetric benefits and costs.  If a loyalty commitment 
 
customer to concentrate order volumes and gain more influence over vendors.” (citation omitted)); 
Elmaghraby, supra note 251, at 351 (“[B]uyers who employ a single sourcing strategy feel that 
the chance of a supply disruption is reduced when a buyer develops a strong relationship with a 
single supplier.”). 
254. Elmaghraby, supra note 251, at 351 (“In addition, buyers feel that they receive the best 
price from their single supplier because of the economies of scale achieved from being awarded 
all of the buyer’s business.”); Manohar U. Kalwani & Narakesari Narayandas, Long-Term 
Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships: Do They Pay Off for Supplier Firms?, J. MARKETING, Jan. 
1995, at 1, 4 (“Supplier firms in long-term relationships are expected to benefit from learning 
effects and relationship-specific scale economies (due to larger volumes over time within a 
relationship), leading to eventual lower costs.”); see also Walter et al., supra note 248, at 4 
(“From a customer’s point of view, supplier relationships should be built in order to achieve 
increased cost efficiency, increased effectiveness, enabling technologies and increased 
competitiveness.”). 
255. Eggert et al., supra note 253 (explaining how loyal buyers can induce sellers to pay 
greater attention to their needs, thereby contributing to lower production costs and influencing 
product innovation). 
256. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. 
257. See Dwyer et al., supra note 248, at 14 (discussing the possibility of “significant gains in 
joint—and consequently individual—payoffs as a result of effective communication and 
collaboration to attain goals”); Amy Zhaohui Zeng, A Synthetic Study of Sourcing Strategies, 100 
INDUS. MGMT. & DATA SYS. 219, 220 (2000) (“It can be noticed that the overlapped benefits for 
both buyer and supplier are revealed in cost reduction, improved communication, flexibility, and 
stability.”). 
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elasticizes the buyer’s demand and thereby enhances its ability to demand a 
lower price, the seller loses.258 
Loyalty is a bargaining chip with varied consequences for sellers and 
buyers.  Without examining the circumstances facing the parties in a 
particular case, it is impossible to determine how the chips will land for 
each side.  It is clear, however, that loyalty is an important part of the 
bargain in many cases and has the potential to increase the welfare of 
buyers, sellers, or both.  An antitrust policy that discouraged or restricted 
the use of loyalty provisions could reduce buyer welfare and social welfare 
overall. 
Conclusion 
Loyalty incentives can be exclusionary if they prevent the seller’s 
rivals from competing for loyal customer business and foreclose so much of 
the relevant market that the rivals are unable to compete.  But that usually is 
not the case.  To the contrary, loyalty discounts are often granted in 
robustly competitive markets and have no exclusionary effects.  They bring 
lower prices to customers willing to forgo their variety preferences and 
consolidate a majority of their purchases in a single supplier. 
This Article has not proposed a comprehensive legal or economic 
framework within which to assess loyalty incentives.  Rather, it has 
suggested that, as a starting point, courts and antitrust agencies think about 
loyalty discounts as true discounts—as price reductions below the price the 
buyer would have to pay if it decided not to behave loyally.  As such, 
 
258. See Klein & Murphy, supra note 36.  Elhauge has argued that the Klein–Murphy model 
of demand elasticization through loyalty commitments is implausible because, if it were true, 
sellers with market power would avoid contracts with loyalty provisions: 
Under [the Klein–Murphy] model, the two sellers in a differentiated market would 
sell at cost and earn zero profits if they used exclusive contracts, but would sell at 
prices that were double their cost if they did not.  Given that premise, it is hard to see 
why the sellers would be willing to bid on an exclusive basis, let alone why, as Klein 
and Murphy assert, sellers would have “the exact same motivation” as retailers to 
initiate exclusive bidding.  Under their model, . . . any seller with market power 
would avoid them. 
Elhauge, supra note 154, at 185 (footnotes omitted).  But that argument ignores the multifaceted 
nature of the benefits and costs to both sellers and buyers of loyalty inducements.  Sellers may 
obtain other benefits from loyalty commitments—such as expanding their market share, 
leveraging fixed costs over more dollars of revenue, achieving scale economies, and optimizing 
planning—that offset any losses from facing a more elastic demand curve.  Further, Elhauge’s 
argument begins with the assumption that loyalty discounts are always seller-driven strategies, or 
that sellers have the power to resist them.  See id.  In fact, as noted, buyers are often the 
instigators.  Sellers would obviously like buyer loyalty without awarding discounts, but faced with 
a buyer demand for a discount in exchange for loyalty, they may not have the power to say no, 
particularly if the buyer has decided to award the bulk of its purchases to a single seller and a 
refusal to entertain a demand for loyalty discount means losing the bulk of the customer’s 
business.  Sellers bargain for loyalty and buyers bargain for discounts; loyalty discounts are the 
marriage of these countervailing pressures. 
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loyalty discounts belong squarely within antitrust’s hospitability tradition 
for unilateral, nonpredatory price discounts, even those that cause 
discomfiture to competitors. 
Loyalty is considered a virtue in most areas of law.  Antitrust should 
be no exception. 
 
